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ARTICLE

America’s Hidden Foster Care System
Josh Gupta-Kagan*
Abstract. In most states, child protection agencies induce parents to transfer physical
custody of their children to kinship caregivers by threatening to place the children in
foster care and bring them to family court. Both the frequency of these actions (this Article
establishes that they occur tens or even hundreds of thousands of times annually) and their
impact (they separate parents and children, sometimes permanently) resemble the formal
foster care system. But they are hidden from courts, because agencies file no petition
alleging abuse or neglect, and hidden from policymakers, because agencies do not
generally report these cases.
While informal custody changes can sometimes serve children’s and families’ interests by
preventing the need for state legal custody, this hidden foster care system raises multiple
concerns, presciently raised in Supreme Court dicta in 1979 in Miller v. Youakim. State
agencies infringe on parents’ and children’s fundamental right to family integrity with few
meaningful due process checks. Agencies avoid legal requirements to make reasonable
efforts to reunify parents and children, licensing requirements intended to ensure that
kinship placements are safe, and requirements to provide foster care maintenance
payments to kinship caregivers.
This Article explains how the present child protection funding system and recent federal
financing reforms further incentivize hidden foster care without regulating it. Moreover,
relatively recent state statutes and policies codify the practice without providing much
regulation. In contrast to this trend, this Article argues for regulation: the opportunity for
a parent to challenge the need for the custody change in court, limits on the length of time
such custody changes can remain in effect without more formal action, the provision of
counsel to parents (using money made available by a separate recent change in federal
child protection funding), and requirements for states to report cases in which their
actions lead to parent-child separations.

* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. Thank you to Christopher

Church, Michael Dsida, Martin Guggenheim, Avni Gupta-Kagan, Lisa Martin, Angie
Schwartz, and Emily Suski for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and to Kendall Eoute
and Hunter Williams for excellent research assistance.
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Introduction
The state child protective services (CPS) agency receives a call alleging that
a parent has abused or neglected a child. The CPS agency1 investigates and
concludes that the parent has, in fact, abused or neglected the child, and further
determines that the child is in such danger in the parent’s custody that the child
needs to live elsewhere immediately. Accordingly, the agency identifies kin
who can take care of the child—the child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, or
godparent—and acts to ensure the child lives with that person, at least
temporarily.
At this point, one might expect the CPS agency to involve a state family
court. The state is limiting one of the most precious substantive liberty rights
recognized by the Constitution—that of parents to the care, custody, and
control of their children—and the reciprocal right of children to live with their
parents. Balancing that fundamental right to family integrity with the state’s
parens patriae power to protect children from abuse and neglect is the subject of
a complex body of federal and state constitutional and statutory law requiring
court hearings focused on parental fitness and child safety.2
Yet in states across the country, this process happens without court
involvement or oversight.3 Instead, the agency threatens to remove children
and take parents to court, a process that could lead to an indefinite placement
of children in foster care, and even termination of parental rights, unless the
parents agree to change their children’s physical custody to the identified
kinship caregiver. The state thus effectuates the children’s loss of their parents’
care and the parents’ loss of physical custody of their children without any
other branch of government checking or balancing the agency’s actions and
without anyone getting a lawyer. It is as if a police department investigated a
crime, concluded an individual was guilty, did not file charges or provide him
with an attorney, and told him he had to agree to go to jail for several weeks or
months, or else it would bring him to court and things could get even worse.
Available data shows the practice occurs with great frequency.4 States do
not track the number of these cases precisely (a problem on its own), but this
Article combines a variety of empirical studies and state-specific documentation
to demonstrate that these cases likely separate tens or hundreds of thousands of
children from their parents annually,5 often for significant periods of time and
1. These agencies have different names in different jurisdictions—for instance, departments

2.
3.
4.
5.

of social services, children’s services, child and family services, etc. For simplicity, I
refer to “CPS agencies” throughout this Article.
See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.
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sometimes permanently.6 It is thus a practice on par with formal foster care—in
both the number of families affected and the impact on those families.
This is America’s hidden foster care system.7 It is a legally undomesticated8
process through which state agencies effectuate a change of custody for
thousands of children with little, if any, meaningful due process. State agencies
thus coerce a surrender of fundamental constitutional rights with no lawyers
or legal checks. This action, and what happens to the children and families
subsequent to this action, is hidden from courts because agencies file no
petition alleging abuse or neglect. It is hidden from the public, the federal
government, and policymakers because federal funding statutes do not require
states to count or report cases in which they arrange for hidden foster care.
Hidden foster care raises multiple concerns. The first and most obvious is
whether threatening to remove children if parents do not place them with
kinship caregivers renders such placements involuntary, thus violating due
process. Substantively, this lack of oversight of agency determinations that
children must be separated from their parents risks unnecessary and harmful
separations. Given CPS agencies’ wide discretion, the limited information often
available at the beginning of a case, and the need to make quick decisions, it is
easy to imagine many errors occurring, especially without court oversight.
Second, the hidden foster care system undermines important legal
protections for children, parents, and kinship caregivers. By avoiding formal
foster care, agencies avoid court oversight of their actions and legal requirements
to develop case plans and make reasonable efforts to reunify parents and
children.9 They avoid foster care’s licensing requirements, which are intended
to ensure kinship placements are safe, thus potentially leaving some children
in dangerous situations.10 They avoid requirements to provide foster care
maintenance payments to kinship caregivers, thus leaving caregivers without
the financial support available to formal foster parents and jeopardizing their
ability to take care of children.11
6. See infra Part I.A.3.
7. Others have used similar phrases. See, e.g., DIANE L. REDLEAF, THEY TOOK THE KIDS LAST

8.

9.
10.
11.

NIGHT: HOW THE CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM PUTS FAMILIES AT RISK 191 (2018) (“shadow
foster care”); Andrew Brown, Shadow Removals: How Safety Plans Allow CPS to Avoid
Judicial Oversight, HILL (May 31, 2019, 9:30 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/TV5F-UDHV
(“shadow removals”).
This phrase is taken from the pathbreaking Supreme Court case In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
22 (1967), which favored the “constitutional domestication” of delinquency cases. In
Gault, “domestication” meant the imposition of basic procedural rights for defendants,
including the provision of counsel, in delinquency cases. See id. at 27-29.
See infra Parts III.B.1-.2.
See infra Part III.B.4.
See infra Part III.B.3.
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The Supreme Court brought together these sets of concerns in its 1979
opinion in Miller v. Youakim, which presciently worried that permitting states
to provide kinship foster parents less financial support would allow states to
remove children from their parents without triggering the judicial checks that
formal foster care and its financial payments require.12 Hidden foster care
shows how the Court’s concerns have been borne out.
Despite these concerns, informal changes in children’s physical custody
can sometimes be useful—allowing children to live at home with kin and
limiting state control over their families.13 Parents may sometimes benefit from
avoiding the court process, which introduces a judge who might believe a more
invasive intervention is required. Hidden foster care leaves children in parents’
legal custody, while court cases could lead a judge to shift legal custody to
the CPS agency. Even if a brief separation from parents is necessary, it may
be in children’s interest to avoid family court intervention that could cause
a separation from all family members, even the kinship caregiver. Kinship
caregivers may prefer informal physical custody of children to a process that
may require CPS agencies to decide whether to grant them a foster care license
and that subjects the kinship caregiver to agency oversight.
This Article’s concern is that absent legal regulation, the status quo gives
CPS agencies tremendous power to determine the unusual case in which
hidden foster care is appropriate. Given the weighty stakes involved and the
state power exercised, more procedural protections should be required.
The hidden foster care phenomenon, and critiques of it, are not new.
Indeed, it has been criticized from multiple ends of the child protection law
spectrum, both by those who want to limit state intervention in families (who
worry about the state effectively changing custody without due process)14 and
by those who want the state to intervene in more families (who worry that
hidden foster care leaves children in unsafe conditions).15
12. See Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 139-40 (1979); see also infra text accompanying

notes 271-72. The Court prevented states from paying formal kinship foster caregivers
less than other foster parents—the correct result, which nonetheless strengthened
financial incentives for states to use hidden foster care. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE KINSHIP DIVERSION DEBATE: POLICY AND PRACTICE
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES 1-2 (2013),
https://perma.cc/5GBW-WLEA (summarizing arguments for and against hidden
foster care).
14. See, e.g., Katherine C. Pearson, Cooperate or We’ll Take Your Child: The Parents’ Fictional
Voluntary Separation Decision and a Proposal for Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 835, 836-37
(1998) (arguing that safety plans are unconstitutionally coercive); Ryan C.F. Shellady,
Note, Martinis, Manhattans, and Maltreatment Investigations: When Safety Plans Are a
False Choice and What Procedural Protections Parents Are Due, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1613,
1616-17 (2019) (same).
15. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: Effective
Early Intervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60 BUFF. L. REV.
footnote continued on next page
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Hidden foster care requires renewed attention because, as this Article
establishes, a growing set of recent federal and state statutes and policies
institutionalize and incentivize the practice without imposing meaningful
regulations. This Article is the first to explain how the present child protection
funding system creates incentives for states to avoid formal foster care and, just
as importantly, how recent (and otherwise positive) federal financing reforms
risk further institutionalization of hidden foster care without regulating it.
Moreover, relatively recent state statutes and policies codify the practice
without providing much regulation. Rather than add essential substantive
limits and procedural protections to ensure safety plans that respect the rights
of affected parents, children, and kinship caregivers, state policies formalize
hidden foster care without addressing its core problems.
This Article argues for the legal domestication of what is now hidden
foster care. First, using state power to change child custody should trigger
strong legal protections for family integrity—including the opportunity for a
parent to challenge the need for the custody change in court and limits on the
length of time such custody changes can remain in effect without more formal
action. Second, any change in physical custody requested by the state should
trigger a right for parents to obtain legal counsel (appointed if necessary) to
advise them on their rights and negotiate appropriate plans with CPS agencies.
New federal financing guidance makes federal funding available to states to
provide attorneys to parents in precisely these cases. These steps recognize that
hidden foster care is sometimes appropriate and therefore would not require
CPS agencies to bring families to court whenever they use hidden foster care.
But they would ensure that parents have a means to protect both their own
and their children’s right to family integrity.
Third, the federal government should take this parallel system of foster
care out of hiding by requiring states to track the number of cases in which
their actions lead to parent-child separations without formal foster care and
what happens to affected children and their families. Presently, the absence of
clear data on the frequency of hidden foster care’s use, duration, effects on the
safety of children, and other impacts on children and families limits policy
discussions regarding the practice. Given the prominence of hidden foster care
and the severity of its infringement on family integrity, gathering basic data
regarding hidden foster care is essential to the future development and
evaluation of policies governing this practice.
Part I of this Article defines the practice of hidden foster care and provides
descriptive evidence of its incredibly wide scope, analogous to that of the
formal foster care system. Part II addresses the due process concerns with the
1323, 1366-67 (2012) (expressing concern that safety plans left children with unsafe
caregivers).
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practice, including a discussion of competing U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
cases regarding the voluntariness of hidden foster care. Part III explains the
policy concerns and policy benefits of the practice. Part IV describes the
perverse incentives to use hidden foster care created by federal child protection
funding laws. Part V describes how recent federal and state statutes and state
agency policies institutionalize the practice of hidden foster care without
adequately regulating the practice. And Part VI offers a range of individual case
and systemic administrative oversight steps that would provide long-overdue
legal regulation to this practice.
I.

Hidden Foster Care: Similar in Function and Scope to Formal
Foster Care

Every year, CPS agencies nationally separate more than 250,000 children
from their parents and place them in formal foster care in the state’s legal
custody under the oversight of a family court judge.16 Some are placed with
strangers, and a growing proportion of foster children—now about one-third—
is placed with kinship caregivers.17 Some of these children leave foster care
within weeks or months, largely to reunify with their parents, but others have
their custody permanently changed. The hidden foster care system separates a
roughly similar number of children, many of whom reunify with and some of
whom are separated permanently from their parents.18 A key difference is that
in formal foster care, CPS agencies take legal custody of children, while in
hidden foster care they induce parents to transfer physical custody to kinship
caregivers through threats of the state taking legal and physical custody. This
supposed voluntariness exempts hidden foster care from both court oversight
and federal data-tracking requirements (which means a precise count of the
number of hidden foster care cases is impossible).
This Part describes generally what hidden foster care is, how it operates, its
impact on children, and its context in relation to kinship foster care.19 This
Part also uses available data to show the wide scope of the hidden foster care

16. This is the number of children counted as having “entered foster care” in a given

year. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS
REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2017 ESTIMATES AS OF AUGUST 10, 2018—NO. 25, at 1 (2018),
https://perma.cc/5HNA-6JMM.
17. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOSTER CARE STATISTICS
2017, at 4 (2019), https://perma.cc/J4QR-839P.
18. See infra Parts I.A.2-.3, .B.
19. The practice varies in some details from state to state, though a complete breakdown of
such differences is beyond this Article’s scope.
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system, which affects at least tens or even hundreds of thousands of children
each year, placing it on par with the formal foster care system.20
A. Hidden Foster Care
Hidden foster care occurs when CPS agencies cause a change in a child’s
physical custody without any family court action, without placing the child in
the agency’s own custody, and without reporting the child’s removal to the
federal government. It follows the same sort of concerns about child safety that
trigger formal foster care—such as concerns about a parent’s drug abuse or
mental health condition that limits their ability to parent a child, physical or
sexual abuse of a child by a parent or other adult, or an unsanitary house. CPS
agencies effectuate hidden foster care via “safety plans”21—agreements between
CPS authorities and parents intended to keep children safe. Safety plans have a
particular meaning in this context. The social work literature defines a safety
plan as “a plan that is developed by the parent, worker, children (depending
upon their age), and [safety] network members to ensure the safety of their
children.”22 Safety plans have their roots in social work practice involving
domestic violence, where social workers seek to empower family members to
design plans intended to keep them safe while taking into account all of their
individual circumstances.23 Safety plans are intended to identify a “safety
network”—individuals who can help keep adults and children safe as needed.24
Crucially, safety plans leading to hidden foster care 25 follow a CPS agency’s
threat to remove children and/or initiate child protection proceedings in family
court if parents refuse to change the child’s custody as the CPS agency insists.
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. The term “safety plan” can also refer to a plan developed after a CPS agency has

22.

23.
24.
25.

removed the child directly or filed a petition. For instance, District of Columbia law
refers to a “safety plan” that the CPS agency develops during the seventy-two hours
between the removal of a child and a family court hearing. D.C. CODE § 16-2312(a)(1)
(2019).
E.g., Stephanie Nelson-Dusek et al., Assessing the Value of Family Safety Networks in Child
Protective Services: Early Findings from Minnesota, 22 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 1365, 1365
(2017).
See id. at 1365-66.
See id.
Safety plans need not lead to hidden foster care; they can, instead, require parents to
comply with steps short of changes in children’s custody. While important to child
protection practice, such safety plans are beyond the scope of this Article. These safety
plans present somewhat different legal and policy issues—they, for instance, do not
introduce alternative caretakers and they infringe less on the right of family integrity.
See, e.g., id. at 1372 (describing safety plans that do not aim to change custody but rather
aim to “identify specific people and strategies that support parents and act as safety
monitors for the children”).
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1.

How it begins: Threats of deeper involvement

The social work goals of safety planning include “increas[ing] family
engagement.”26 It bears analysis whether safety plans are truly voluntarily
accepted by families and thus whether this goal is met. That analysis is essential
when the social worker works for a CPS agency and has authority to remove
children from parents’ custody and initiate legal action to declare the parents
unfit. As Part II will discuss, a central legal debate is whether these safety plans
are voluntary agreements akin to any contract or civil settlement or whether a
CPS threat to remove children renders such plans coercive.
While the debate over the implication of CPS agency threats remains
open, there is no question that CPS does threaten to remove children
immediately if parents do not agree to a safety plan that calls for children’s
physical custody to change, typically shifting the child to the custody of a
kinship caregiver. CPS agency policies, safety plan forms, and caseworker
reports all confirm that CPS induces agreements to safety plans through
threats to remove children. Threats are sometimes stated explicitly on safety
plan forms. A Kentucky safety plan form, for example, stated in all
capital letters that “ABSENT EFFECTIVE PREVENTATIVE SERVICES” through the
CPS agency’s safety plan, “PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE IS THE PLANNED
ARRANGEMENT FOR THIS CHILD.”27 The form used in South Carolina is similarly
forceful, providing in bold type, “If the parent(s) refuse to sign a valid safety
plan, an out of home placement must be sought by Law Enforcement or Ex parte
Order to keep the child safe, pending the completion of the investigation.”28
Other states use somewhat subtler but similarly threatening language.29 Such
threats are confirmed by CPS agency policies, which make clear that agencies
will seek the immediate removal of children if parents do not agree to a safety
plan, and emphasize that this threat is essential to inducing compliance. One
illustrative policy states that a safety plan
is only effective if all parties agree to the plan and understand that [CPS] will
consider the child unsafe if the parties do not comply with the agreed terms of the

26. See id. at 1365.
27. Schulkers v. Kammer, 367 F. Supp. 3d 626, 634 (E.D. Ky. 2019), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part,

No. 19-5208, 2020 WL 1502446 (6th Cir. Mar. 30, 2020).
28. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Safety Plan (Form 3087), at 2 (2012), https://perma.cc/3YPF-

D3QG; see also Dupuy v. Samuels, 462 F. Supp. 2d 859, 868 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (noting that
Illinois CPS officials used safety plan forms with boilerplate language stating that they
could remove children if parents refused to agree to the safety plan), aff ’d, 465 F.3d 757
(7th Cir. 2006).
29. See, e.g., Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 598 (6th Cir. 2008) (reporting Ohio’s form
language threatening that if parents “will not be able to continue following the plan,
[CPS] may have to take other action(s) to keep your child(ren) safe”).
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plan and [that CPS] will initiate the legal action to protect the child through the
removal of the child from the parent’s custody and control.30

Threats are sometimes otherwise stated in communications between CPS
authorities and parents—often with little nuance.31 As one CPS worker told
the Annie E. Casey Foundation, a major child welfare research and funding
organization: “We say we want a child welfare system that values family
decisions . . . , but once the government gets involved, relatives and parents don’t
always have real choices. Sometimes it’s auntie or else.”32
Even without explicit threats, the absence of court oversight of safety
plans provides “opportunities for manipulation of the parents”33 through
implied threats or by CPS agencies’ failure (intentional or not) to fully inform
parents of their options. CPS agencies can, through form language and verbal
threats, communicate that parents must agree to safety plans or else see the
agency place their children in foster care, even when no plans to follow
through on that threat exist.34 The absence of court oversight also means that a
CPS agency’s precise words and actions taken to induce parental agreement to a
safety plan can remain subject to dispute and unresolved.35 Indeed, the absence
of court oversight removes a strong incentive for CPS officials to be careful to
avoid overly threatening language.
30. S.C. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., HUMAN SERVICES POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL: CHAPTER 7,

CHILD PROTECTIVE AND PREVENTIVE SERVICES § 719.02 (2019), https://perma.cc/VG69M958.
31. For instance, in Smith, the parents alleged that the CPS caseworker threatened that
they could lose their children forever if they did not follow the safety plan. 520 F.3d at
598. In a case in South Carolina, a CPS agency lawyer wrote to a parent’s attorney:
If [the parent] chooses to violate the safety plan, we can seek a court action and a finding of
physical abuse and central registry along with removing custody, if she wants to go that route
OR she can continue to cooperate, and we can attempt to resolve this matter without court
intervention.

32.
33.
34.

35.

Email from Emily Sordian, Managing Attorney, Orangeburg & Calhoun Ctys., to
Skyler Hutto et al. (July 24, 2018, 9:21 AM), reprinted in Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion
to Dismiss, exhibit A, Adams v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 2019-CP-38-00036 (S.C. Ct.
Com. Pl. Apr. 12, 2019). In the interest of full disclosure, I was retained as an expert by
the plaintiff in Adams.
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 13, at 1.
See Pearson, supra note 14, at 842.
See, e.g., Schulkers v. Kammer, 367 F. Supp. 3d 626, 634 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (reciting threats
from CPS agencies even though “[i]n truth, there was no planned arrangement for
foster care”), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 19-5208, 2020 WL 1502446 (6th Cir. Mar. 30,
2020).
Pearson, supra note 14, at 841-42. Pearson also cites to cases raising questions about the
specific circumstances of safety plan agreements, such as one alleging that CPS staff
made a parent sign a safety plan agreement that was partially blank, threatening to “tell
the judge” if she did not. See, e.g., id. at 841 & n.31 (quoting In re J.H., 480 So. 2d 680, 683
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
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CPS agencies’ role in inducing safety plans creates definitional challenges
for scholars. Consider this distinction between private and public kinship care
by leading scholar Dorothy Roberts: “As a matter of definition, private kinship
care is arranged by families without child welfare agency involvement;
kinship foster care, meanwhile, is provided to children who are in the legal
custody of the state.”36 Hidden foster care not only follows CPS agency
involvement, but is usually specifically requested by CPS authorities.37 Still,
legal custody does not transfer, and certainly does not transfer to the state,
leaving parents, children, and kinship caregivers without a clear legal status
governing the situation insisted upon by the CPS agency.38
Similarly, child protection agencies and policy leaders have struggled to
precisely define CPS agencies’ role in setting up hidden foster care. They often
use language that avoids stating that CPS agencies direct the process, but
nonetheless makes clear that CPS agencies have central, even decisive, roles.
Consider, for instance, a 2016 white paper published by Child Trends, a leading
child welfare think tank. It opens by using the passive voice to describe the
phenomenon—“kinship diversion” occurs when “children are placed with
relatives as an alternative to foster care”—avoiding the question of who
precisely does the placing.39 The federal Children’s Bureau has similarly used
the passive voice—“children who are known to the child welfare agency are
placed with relatives without the State or Tribe assuming legal custody.”40
Meanwhile, by the next paragraph of its white paper, Child Trends moves on
to an ambiguous verb—“a child welfare agency facilitates the placement of a
child with relatives or fictive kin.”41 Deeper in, the white paper makes clear
that when abuse or neglect is suspected, CPS agencies are “the primary influence
in suggesting” a change in custody and seeking parental agreement.42 The
Children’s Bureau chose a different, slightly less ambiguous verb—“the child
welfare agency arranges for a placement without any court involvement.”43
36. Dorothy E. Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for Children, 76 CHI.-KENT

L. REV. 1619, 1623 (2001).
37. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
39. See KARIN MALM & TIFFANY ALLEN, CHILD TRENDS, PUB. NO. 2016-24, RESEARCH BRIEF: A

40.
41.

42.
43.

QUALITATIVE RESEARCH STUDY OF KINSHIP DIVERSION PRACTICES 1 (2016) (emphasis
added), https://perma.cc/2JM7-4KMK.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WORKING WITH KINSHIP
CAREGIVERS 3 (2018) (emphasis added), https://perma.cc/B389-JZB7.
MALM & ALLEN, supra note 39, at 1. “Fictive kin” refers to individuals with family-like
relationships that lack a relationship through blood or marriage. CHILDREN’S BUREAU,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN WITH RELATIVES 2
(2018), https://perma.cc/MD86-CJGS.
See MALM & ALLEN, supra note 39, at 3.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 40, at 3 (emphasis added).

851

America’s Hidden Foster Care System
72 STAN. L. REV. 841 (2020)

Multiple other scholars and think tanks emphasize state authorities’ central
role in making kinship diversion placements happen.44 CPS caseworkers are
“often” the ones to call potential caregivers and ask if they will take the child
into their home.45
Safety plans are generally arranged without the provision of counsel to
parents.46 Parents therefore do not generally have a lawyer to consult about
the validity of CPS threats to remove children, their likelihood of success in
any court hearing, or the tactical advantages or disadvantages of cooperating
temporarily with CPS officials. Moreover, parents lack a lawyer to help
negotiate terms of any safety plan, such as duration, visitation, decisionmaking
authority, or events that would trigger the plan’s termination.
2.

What it does: Changes physical custody

Through hidden foster care, CPS agencies effectuate changes in physical
but not legal custody,47 while in formal foster care a court order shifts legal
custody from parents to a CPS agency. But hidden foster care effectuates the
same day-to-day changes in children’s reality—it changes the person with
whom they live, often permanently. Family court judges can, of course, remove
children from their parents’ physical custody and place them in foster care,
including kinship foster care.48 Family courts can also allow children to
remain in their own homes and order one or both parents to leave.49 Both steps
mirror what happens in hidden foster care. A safety plan could require the
child to leave the home and move in with a kinship caregiver—with or
without a parent present.50 Or the child could remain in the home, but a parent
whom CPS has concluded has maltreated the child would be required to leave.51
44. See, e.g., ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 13, at 1 (describing how “child welfare

agencies rely” on kinship diversion and “direct[] children to live with willing relatives”).
45. Gerard William Wallace & Eunju Lee, Diversion and Kinship Care: A Collaborative Approach

46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Between Child Welfare Services and NYS’s Kinship Navigator, 16 J. FAM. SOC. WORK 418,
422 (2013).
See Tara Grigg Garlinghouse & Scott Trowbridge, Child Well-Being in Context, 18 U. PA.
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 105, 117 (2015).
See, e.g., S.C. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 30, § 719.02. Legal custody refers to who
holds decisionmaking authority regarding a child. Custody, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019). Physical custody refers to where the child lives. Physical Custody,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1660 (2019).
See, e.g., In re Blakeman, 926 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018) (describing a parent’s
appeal from a family court order removing him from the family home).
See, e.g., S.C. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 30, § 719.02.
E.g., Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1124-25 (3d
Cir. 1997).
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The child could remain in the home, and a kinship caregiver could be required to
move in.52 These last two options could be combined, with one or both parents
required to leave their child and their home and a kinship caregiver agreeing to
move in and take physical custody of the child.53 Through the most severe of
these options—when parents leave their home without their children or when
children move into a kinship caregiver’s home without their parents—parents
and children lose their right to live together. Even when parents and children
can remain together, the required addition of another adult in the home gives
that person significant power and diminishes the parents’ authority over the
child.54
Kinship care is not limited to hidden foster care and physical custody
changes. In fact, kinship care is frequently used in the formal foster care system
and has a strong research base in that context. While CPS agencies placed
only about 18% of foster children in kinship homes in the mid-1980s, they
dramatically increased their usage of kinship care later in the decade as the
number of children those agencies removed increased sharply following
concerns about increasing drug addiction (among other causes), and there was
an increased desire to keep children in their own extended families and
communities when possible.55 Though kinship care initially began to fill an
urgent need for more foster placements, a growing body of research showed
significant benefits from kinship care.56 Children are more likely to feel that
they belong with kinship caregivers than in foster care with strangers,57 can
52. See, e.g., S.C. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 30, § 719.02.
53. See, e.g., REDLEAF, supra note 7, at 5, 22-24 (describing one such case and noting that this

fact pattern is “routine” in Illinois).
54. Safety plans can also require parents to change a parenting practice without changing

physical custody. For instance, in one well-publicized case, CPS authorities were
concerned about ten- and six-year-old siblings walking home from a park alone and
required the father to sign a safety plan agreeing not to leave his children unsupervised
or else face the removal of his children. See David Pimentel, Fearing the Bogeyman: How
the Legal System’s Overreaction to Perceived Danger Threatens Families and Children, 42
PEPP. L. REV. 235, 239 n.8 (2015) (describing the case and citing its media coverage).
55. See Mark F. Testa & Jennifer Miller, Evolution of Private Guardianship as a Child Welfare
Resource, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF
PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 405, 410-11 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess
eds., 2005); see also Roberts, supra note 36, at 1624 (“An exploding foster care population
combined with a shortage of licensed nonrelative foster homes made relatives an
attractive placement option.”).
56. For a recent summary of research findings on the benefits of kinship care, see Christina
McClurg Riehl & Tara Shuman, Children Placed in Kinship Care: Recommended Policy
Changes to Provide Adequate Support for Kinship Families, 39 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 101, 10408 (2019).
57. See Eun Koh & Mark F. Testa, Propensity Score Matching of Children in Kinship and
Nonkinship Foster Care: Do Permanency Outcomes Still Differ?, 32 SOC. WORK RES. 105, 115
(2008).
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more easily remain with their siblings,58 have fewer behavioral problems and
better mental health,59 and are significantly less likely to have their initial
placement disrupted or to experience multiple moves from one foster placement
to another.60 Some advocates also argue that kinship foster care is consistent
with long traditions of extended family and fictive kinship care, especially
among black families.61 Kinship care rates have continued to grow in recent
years; in 2017, about one-third of all children in formal foster care lived with a
kinship caregiver, up from one-fourth in 2007.62
3.

How long it lasts and how it ends

The length and long-term outcomes of hidden foster care are similar to
those of the formal foster care system. Relatively little data demonstrates hidden
foster care cases’ duration or how they end, and significant variations between
states are likely. One detailed review in Texas, however, reveals that in most
cases, hidden foster care triggers a long-term if not permanent change in
custody. In fiscal year 2014, Texas authorities used hidden foster care in 34,000
cases and reunified children and parents that same year in around 13,000 of
those63—meaning that in more than 60% of hidden foster care cases in Texas,
children remained with kinship caregivers. While CPS authorities brought
some cases to court (about 4,000, or 12%), most of the remaining children lived
with kinship caregivers without a formal change in custody or the court
oversight that such a change would require.64
Safety plans last for inconsistent periods of time, and agency practice and
policy do not always align. In South Carolina, for instance, a policy provides
that safety plans may only be in place for ninety days.65 But individual cases

58. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 40, at 4.
59. See Marc Winokur et al., Kinship Care for the Safety, Permanency, and Well-Being of

60.

61.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Children Removed from the Home for Maltreatment (Review), COCHRAN DATABASE
SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 19 (Jan. 31, 2014), https://perma.cc/A5AG-Y63Y.
See, e.g., Eun Koh, Permanency Outcomes of Children in Kinship and Non-Kinship Foster
Care: Testing the External Validity of Kinship Effects, 32 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV.
389, 390, 393, 396 (2010); Koh & Testa, supra note 57, at 112.
See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 36, at 1621-22; Maria Scannapieco & Sondra Jackson,
Kinship Care: The African American Response to Family Preservation, 41 SOC. WORK 190,
190-92 (1996).
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 17, at 4.
CHILDREN’S COMM’N, SUPREME COURT OF TEX., PARENTAL CHILD SAFETY PLACEMENTS 3,
13 (2015), https://perma.cc/5UVU-RC5J.
See id.
S.C. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 30, § 719.02.
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show the agency enforcing safety plans beyond ninety days.66 Beyond South
Carolina, a majority of state CPS agencies surveyed by Child Trends said they
used hidden foster care, and a majority of those states reported that they
“discontinue ongoing supervision with the caregiver and leave the caregiver as
the physical custodian of the child.”67 That is, CPS agencies often cause (or, if
one prefers, facilitate68 or arrange69) a change in a child’s physical custody and
then end their involvement with the family without doing anything to change
legal custody. Most agencies reported that they did not believe they were
obligated in these cases to go to family court and seek an adjudication of
neglect.70
Long-term (and certainly permanent) parent-child separations through
hidden foster care resemble the most drastic consequences of formal foster care
cases. Even when hidden foster care does not last long and children return to
their parents’ physical custody quickly, the system resembles the formal foster
care system. Children who reunify within weeks or months follow a timeline
that is normal in formal foster care cases: 9% of all children removed into foster
care leave in less than one month, 24% leave in less than six months, and 43%
leave in less than twelve months.71
B. Scope of Hidden Foster Care
There is no precise count or even estimate of hidden foster care cases.
States generally do not track the number of children whose custody changes
through safety plans, and certainly not in a consistent manner, preventing any
precise and reliable national estimate.72 This data gap exists because federal
foster care reporting requirements do not require the collection of such data.

66. E.g., Complaint ¶ 13, Adams v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 2019-CP-38-00036 (S.C. Ct.

Com. Pl. Jan. 6, 2019).
67. See TIFFANY ALLEN ET AL., CHILD TRENDS, STATE KINSHIP CARE POLICIES FOR CHILDREN

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

THAT COME TO THE ATTENTION OF CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES: FINDINGS FROM THE 2007
CASEY KINSHIP FOSTER CARE POLICY SURVEY 12 (2008), https://perma.cc/R7RN-BUR9.
See supra text accompanying note 41.
See supra text accompanying note 43.
See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 67, at 13.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 16, at 3 (providing data from fiscal year 2017).
See, e.g., MALM & ALLEN, supra note 39, at 6 (“With no standardized policies and
procedures for kinship diversion practice, and no data gathered to track children who
have been diverted, agencies do not know exactly how [the] practice is carried out and
how diverted families are being served.”); Wallace & Lee, supra note 45, at 419 (“Many
of these diversion placements are unlikely to be included in official child welfare
databases. Therefore, the actual number of children placed with child welfare agency
involvement is unknown . . . .” (citations omitted)).
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States must report data regarding all children in foster care,73 and federal data
reporting regulations apply only to children living in formal foster care.74
Children in hidden foster care are simply not covered, so states need not track
these cases.75
Despite this data gap, strong evidence suggests that the scope of the hidden
foster care system is quite large; the number of children who pass through
hidden foster care each year is roughly comparable with the number of children
removed from their families, brought to court, and placed in formal foster care.
The few studies to offer specific estimates suggest that hundreds of
thousands of children go through hidden foster care each year. A child welfare
think tank studied several local jurisdictions and found that the ratio of hidden
foster care to formal foster care cases ranged from 7:10 to roughly 1:1.76 Those
ratios are consistent with older estimates. Detailed data regarding 5,873 children
with child protection cases in 2008 and 2009 in eighty-three counties across the
country77 revealed that nearly half of children who did not live at home
following a CPS investigation lived in informal kinship care.78 That is, when a
CPS investigation leads to a child not living with a parent, about half of the
73. See 45 C.F.R. § 1355.40(b)(1) (2019). These requirements govern the Adoption and Foster

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS). See AFCARS, CHILD. BUREAU,
https://perma.cc/NGZ3-7WBW (archived Feb. 12, 2020) (describing the AFCARS data
system).
45 C.F.R. § 1355.42(a) (listing three circumstances that trigger reporting requirements,
all of which are conditioned on CPS agencies having placement and care responsibility
or paying foster care maintenance payments).
A different federal child welfare data collection program, the National Child Abuse
and Neglect Data System, similarly fails to collect data regarding hidden foster care.
That data, and publications based on it, reports the number of cases investigated
by CPS agencies and the findings of those investigations but does not count CPSarranged changes in custody as results of such investigations. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2017, at viii-ix
(2018), https://perma.cc/7UUZ-KL5Y; About NCANDS, CHILD. BUREAU (June 18, 2015),
https://perma.cc/ZTV3-LCBT. Moreover, this data reporting system is voluntary, not
mandatory, for states. 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20(a).
KARIN MALM ET AL., CHILD TRENDS, PUB. NO. 2019-34, VARIATIONS IN THE USE OF
KINSHIP DIVERSION AMONG CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES: EARLY ANSWERS TO IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS 3 (2019), https://perma.cc/LR2N-GSVW.
Data were gathered from the second National Survey of Child and Adolescent WellBeing, a federally funded study of children whose child protection investigations
closed between February 2008 and April 2009. MELISSA DOLAN ET AL., OFFICE OF
PLANNING, RESEARCH & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REP.
NO. 2011-27a, NSCAW II BASELINE REPORT: INTRODUCTION TO NSCAW II, at 1 (2011),
https://perma.cc/UHD8-U9WR.
See id. at 9. The percentage of such children in informal kinship care following a CPS
investigation is 47% in rural areas and 49% in urban areas. Wendy A. Walsh, Carsey
Inst., Fact Sheet No. 24, Informal Kinship Care Most Common Out-of-Home Placement
After an Investigation of Child Maltreatment 1 (2013), https://perma.cc/AQN9-3746.
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time a child ends up in the formal foster care system (meaning the child has a
court case and some kind of formalized placement with kin, with nonkinship
foster parents, or in a group home), and the other half of the time the
child ends up living with kin informally in hidden foster care. Extrapolated
nationwide, this study suggests that 250,000 or more children enter hidden
foster care every year.79 A 2002 study estimated that at least 137,000 abused or
neglected children were living with kinship caregivers after CPS agency, but
not court, involvement.80 Other data points are consistent with there being
tens if not hundreds of thousands of children in hidden foster care each year. A
2007 survey of state CPS agencies found that thirty-nine states used hidden
foster care—or, in the language of the survey, “rel[ied] on kin to divert children
from foster care.”81 Whatever the precise number, multiple scholars and think
tanks reviewing the topic describe the practice as frequent—it is “quite
common,”82 “increasing,”83 “an increasingly important part of child welfare
practice,”84 and used “often.”85
Data from some specific states confirm that tens of thousands of children
pass through hidden foster care each year in those states alone—suggesting
the national figure is likely in the hundreds of thousands. Texas authorities
documented that in 2014, they facilitated “informal kinship placements” about
34,000 times86—almost three times as often as Texas authorities brought cases
79. The number of children who enter formal foster care (kinship or otherwise) is

80.

81.
82.

83.
84.
85.

86.

reported by each state to the federal government and has ranged from 251,000 to
273,000 annually between 2009 and 2018. Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Trends in Foster Care and Adoption: FY 2009-FY 2018, at 1 (2019),
https://perma.cc/6R6H-73LJ.
See Jennifer Ehrle et al., Urban Inst., Snapshots of America’s Families III: Kinship Foster
Care; Custody, Hardships, and Services 2 fig.1 (2003), https://perma.cc/67Z7-8VSM
(reporting that 542,000 abused and neglected children with kinship caregivers were
“involved with social services” but only 405,000 of those were also “involved with
courts,” a difference of 137,000). The estimate increases to approximately 400,000 when
excluding only those children in formal foster care, as at least one think tank has done.
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 13, at 5.
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 67, at 11-13.
James P. Gleeson et al., Becoming Involved in Raising a Relative’s Child: Reasons, Caregiver
Motivations and Pathways to Informal Kinship Care, 14 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 300, 308
(2009).
MALM & ALLEN, supra note 39, at 6.
Wallace & Lee, supra note 45, at 427.
Eunju Lee et al., Placement Stability of Children in Informal Kinship Care: Age, Poverty, and
Involvement in the Child Welfare System, 95 CHILD WELFARE, no. 3, 2017, at 87, 89. Lee and
her coauthors found that for children living informally with kin, “[a]lmost two-thirds
had at least one CPS record prior to moving in with the current kin caregiver,” id. at 98,
although public child welfare agencies along with other community sources helped
identify families for the study, which may have skewed the results, see id. at 105.
CHILDREN’S COMM’N, supra note 63, at 3.
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involving alleged child abuse or neglect to court.87 Hidden foster care cases in
Illinois have been estimated at 10,000 per year.88 In Virginia, data for some
local CPS agencies suggest that statewide, CPS agencies placed about 5,000
children in hidden foster care between July 2016 and December 201789—a
figure greater than the number of children placed in formal foster care in the
same period.90 In South Carolina, at least 2,318 children were living in kinship
care under a safety plan rather than with their parents in the summer of 2018,
without having gone to court.91 South Carolina authorities reported that 4,239
children “entered foster care” that year;92 had they brought all of the hidden
foster care cases to court and counted them as removals, the number of
reported removals would have increased 55%. Data taken from a New York
state program to better support kinship caregivers found that, of those children
with prior CPS involvement, the vast majority (77%) were placed with kinship
caregivers without court proceedings.93 Arizona media reported that 702

87. Texas reported 11,334 “victims with court action” in 2014. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S.

88.
89.

90.

91.

92.
93.

DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2014, at 85 tbl.6-5 (2016),
https://perma.cc/K44L-EBTQ.
See REDLEAF, supra note 7, at 43.
Katie O’Connor, Every Year, Children Are Diverted Away from Foster Care and Placed
with Relatives. Nobody Knows What Happens Next., VA. MERCURY (June 3, 2019),
https://perma.cc/HEV6-H4JE; see also VA. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., REVIEW OF CURRENT
POLICIES GOVERNING FACILITATION OF PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN KINSHIP CARE TO
AVOID FOSTER CARE PLACEMENTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR REGULATIONS GOVERNING KINSHIP CARE PLACEMENTS 4 (2016), https://perma.cc/
HET8-8VJG (reporting that 94% of local Virginia CPS agencies use the “widespread”
practice).
Virginia removed and placed into formal foster care 2,158 children in fiscal year 2017.
See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 75, at 90 tbl.6-4 (indicating that 1,280 victims and
878 nonvictims received foster care services). Assuming a roughly similar removal rate,
there would have been about 3,300 children placed in formal foster care in the same
eighteen-month time period when 5,000 were placed in hidden foster care.
See Taron Brown Davis, S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., State of Child Welfare Services 17
(Aug. 31, 2018) (presentation on file with author). This figure includes 105 “children
living with a kinship caregiver during an open investigation” and 2,213 “children
living with a kinship caregiver while [they are] receiving family preservation/in home
treatment services.” Id.
S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Reasons Youth Entered Foster Care During SFY 2018, at 1
(2018) (capitalization altered), https://perma.cc/NGT7-VHD9.
Wallace & Lee, supra note 45, at 422. The director of that program testified that New
York data show about 2,000 children every year are placed in a “kin placement”
through “direct custody” other than foster care. Gerard Wallace & Ryan Johnson, NYS
Kinship Navigator, Testimony for the Joint Legislative Hearing on the Governor’s
Proposed Human Services Budget 15 (2019) (capitalization altered), https://perma.cc/
8DCA-MR49.

858

America’s Hidden Foster Care System
72 STAN. L. REV. 841 (2020)

children were “removed under a present-danger plan” in 2018.94 Studies of states’
differential response programs—which are designed to provide alternatives to
formal investigations, court proceedings, and removals—have found that “at
least five states permit a child to be removed from the home while the family
participates in a differential response system.”95
These authorities show that hidden foster care is used both while a child
protection investigation is pending and after the agency concludes its
investigation.96 The distinction is important because limiting the practice to
pending investigations would limit its scope significantly, both in overall number
and in length, because state laws require CPS agencies to complete investigations
within a set time period.97 The record of CPS agencies using hidden foster care
well beyond investigation periods—and sometimes for permanent changes in
custody98—is thus a key element of the practice’s wide scope.
In addition to the practice’s wide scope, evidence also suggests that hidden
foster care has grown in frequency over the last decade and a half. A 2007
survey found an increasing reliance by states on the practice as part of a larger
trend in which states sought to avoid foster care placements.99 By 2010, the
National Conference on State Legislatures (NCSL) listed “divert[ing] children
from foster care, when safe and appropriate, through voluntary placement
with relatives” as a recommended practice.100 Moreover, Congress enacted
federal statutes that facilitate the practice in 2008 and again in 2018,101 making
continued expansion likely.
94. Patty Machelor, Arizona’s Voluntary Child Removals Use Method Challenged in Other States,

95.
96.

97.
98.
99.
100.

101.

ARIZ. DAILY STAR (May 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/A2UR-9BCW. As a percentage of
the system, this count is relatively modest—4.6% of all removals in Arizona—likely
because they are limited to twenty-eight days. Id.
Soledad A. McGrath, Differential Response in Child Protection Services: Perpetuating the
Illusion of Voluntariness, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 629, 633 (2012).
Safety plans are sometimes described as only governing cases during pending
investigations. See, e.g., Shellady, supra note 14, at 1616. But, as certain sources cited in
notes 91-95 above have found, the practice is used in cases when investigations are
complete and CPS agencies seek to work with the family without using formal foster
care. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 91. The practice is also used in some states’ differential
response programs, which do not involve any investigation. See McGrath, supra note 95,
at 633.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 4-1301.06(a) (2019) (30-day limit); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-920(A)(2)
(2019) (45-day limit, with a single 15-day extension available for good cause).
See supra Part I.A.3.
See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 67, at 12.
MADELYN FREUNDLICH, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LEGISLATIVE
STRATEGIES TO SAFELY REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 8-9 (2010),
https://perma.cc/5HD8-UZ29. The NCSL went so far as to recommend legislation
requiring CPS agencies to use hidden foster care. See id.
See infra Part V.A.
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This large and growing scope leads to an important conclusion—hidden
foster care is so common that it is roughly on par in frequency with formal
foster care itself. It affects roughly as many children—many of whom likely are
unaware of the difference between being in the formal or hidden foster care
systems. This practice is not a narrow one used in unusual cases,102 but one that
is a system of its own, and one that requires a comparable amount of regulation
and critical analysis.
II. Due Process Challenges and Justifications
Any state action that interferes with parental authority over children—and
certainly state action that separates parents and children—raises substantive
and procedural due process concerns. Parents have the fundamental right to
the care, custody, and control of their children, as the Supreme Court has
recognized in a long set of opinions for nearly a century.103 The law also
presumes that children benefit from this arrangement—absent evidence of
parental unfitness, parents are presumed to act in their children’s best interest.104
Consistent with that presumption, multiple lower courts have recognized that
children also have a fundamental constitutional right to live in their parents’
custody.105 To protect these rights, the Supreme Court, state courts, and state
legislatures have adopted a range of due process protections. Before the state
can declare a child neglected or dependent, the state must prove a parent
unfit.106 If the state seeks to remove a child before it is able to prove a parent
unfit at trial, it must meet an even more difficult standard—not only that the
parent has abused or neglected the child, but that the abuse or neglect presents
a risk so substantial and imminent that emergency action is necessary to protect
the child.107
102. Cf. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 13, at 3 (noting that supporters argue that

103.

104.
105.

106.
107.

kinship diversion is only appropriate for “cases in between” and critics argue that it is
“too often used as a default”).
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (plurality opinion); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753, 758-59 (1982); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Pierce v.
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (plurality opinion); Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
See, e.g., Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999); Franz v. United States,
707 F.2d 582, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir.
1977); In re Juvenile Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313, 1318 (Conn. 1983); Amanda C. v. Case, 749
N.W.2d 429, 438 (Neb. 2008). Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court in Stanley
wrote that when children are removed from their parents, they “suffer from
uncertainty and dislocation.” Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647.
A parent is entitled to a “hearing on [their] fitness as a parent before [their] children
[are] taken from [them].” Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-620(A)(1) (2019); In re Juvenile Appeal, 455 A.2d at 1319-20.
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Hidden foster care avoids court hearings constitutionally required in the
formal foster care system, so the most obvious legal question is whether that
avoidance of court oversight violates the parents’ and children’s rights to family
integrity without due process of law. The question hinges on the voluntariness
of parents’ agreements to safety plans calling for their children to live in
someone else’s physical custody. If parents voluntarily choose to shift physical
custody, then hidden foster care is no different from the situation of millions of
children who live with individuals other than their parents without state
child protection agency intervention.108 If, however, the state coerces parents
to give up custody through threats to remove children and initiate court
proceedings, then that is not a voluntary choice and the state has violated the
Due Process Clause.
All federal courts to address these questions have agreed that CPS authorities
violate parents’ due process rights if they make legally unjustifiable threats to
induce parents to accept a change in their children’s physical custody.109 The
question whether hidden foster care is acceptable when CPS agency threats to
remove children have some legal basis, however, has split federal circuits,110
and the following Subpart will outline circuits’ competing arguments. This
Article takes the position that threatening to remove a child and file an abuse
or neglect case against a parent is inherently coercive, thus creating a procedural
due process problem with hidden foster care. The remainder of this Article,
however, does not depend on that conclusion. As the next Subpart establishes,
courts finding that hidden foster care is truly voluntary still use analysis that
supports the proposals for regulation that I advance in Part VI.
A. Foster Care or Hidden Foster Care: Like a Choice of Cocktails
The leading case for the proposition that hidden foster care is voluntary and
thus not in violation of due process is Dupuy v. Samuels. In Dupuy, the Seventh
Circuit rejected class action plaintiffs’ challenge to the Illinois CPS agency’s
108. The U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey estimates that nearly 3 million

children live without any parents. See Historical Living Arrangements of Children: Living
Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years Old; 1960 to Present, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://perma.cc/5CGX-7JTC (last updated Oct. 10, 2019) (estimating that in 2019,
2,319,000 children lived with relatives without parents, and 647,000 lived with
nonrelatives without parents). Only about 450,000 children are in formal foster care.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 16, at 1. The number of children who pass through
hidden foster care is likely in the low six figures, see supra Part I.B, leaving the vast
majority of children in kinship care without any CPS agency involvement.
109. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
110. See Daniel Pollack et al., The Use of Coercion in the Child Maltreatment Investigation Field:
A Comparison of American and Scottish Perspectives, 22 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
129, 142-46 (2015).
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frequent practice of threatening to remove children and initiate child protection
proceedings if parents did not agree to change a child’s physical custody via a
safety plan.111 Dupuy described a safety plan as requiring one parent to leave
the home and/or only see their child in the presence of an approved family
member, or requiring that the child live with a family member other than a
parent.112
The trial court findings included several details used by the plaintiffs to
cast doubt on safety plans’ voluntariness.113 CPS caseworkers usually presented
plans for parents to sign with no meaningful parental input.114 The CPS
agency, both in writing and verbally, threatened parents with the removal of
their children if they failed to agree.115 Safety plans generally did not specify a
time period for which they would be in effect, nor did the agency create a
procedure to contest a safety plan.116
Nonetheless, Judge Posner’s opinion concluded that hidden foster care is
the result of voluntary choices by parents to temporarily relinquish physical
custody of their child. In the Seventh Circuit panel’s view, an agency demanding
that a parent relinquish physical custody through a safety plan and threatening
to remove a child and open a CPS case in family court if the parent does not
comply is simply giving a parent an option they would not otherwise have—the
safety plan is merely an “offer” provided by CPS authorities as an alternative to
going to court.117 It continued:
We can’t see how parents are made worse off by being given the option of
accepting the offer of a safety plan. It is rare to be disadvantaged by having more
rather than fewer options. If you tell a guest that you will mix him either a
Martini or a Manhattan, how is he worse off than if you tell him you’ll mix him a
Martini?118

Judge Posner’s reasoning offers several important points in support of this
conclusion. First, this scenario is only truly voluntary when the CPS agency
legitimately threatens to remove the child and/or go to court; if the CPS agency
111. Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2006). For a description of the Dupuy litigation,

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

118.

including a critique of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling by an attorney for the plaintiffs, see
REDLEAF, supra note 7, at 37-50. See also McGrath, supra note 95, at 677-81.
Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 760.
See McGrath, supra note 95, at 678.
Dupuy v. Samuels, 462 F. Supp. 2d 859, 867 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff ’d, 465 F.3d 757.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 871.
Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 760 (noting that “sometimes, in lieu of immediately removing the
child from its parents, the state will offer the parents the option of agreeing to a ‘safety
plan’”); id. at 761 (“The state does not force a safety plan on the parents; it merely offers
it.”).
Id. at 762.
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lacks the factual basis or legal authority to carry out such a threat, then making
it would render coercive an insistence that a parent agree to a safety plan.119
Judge Posner distinguished legitimate legal threats from “objectionable” coercion
based on legally unjustifiable threats.120 (He did not address the reasonableness
of expecting parents to evaluate the legitimacy of a CPS agency threat to
remove their children.121) Further, Judge Posner distinguished seemingly contrary
precedent as involving situations in which CPS authorities made improper
threats.122
Second, Judge Posner drew an analogy between a safety plan leading to
hidden foster care and a negotiated settlement—either a criminal plea bargain
or a civil pretrial settlement.123 Criminal plea bargains provide significantly
more formal procedural protections for defendants, so they present a curious
analogy. Plea bargains occur after defendants have been formally charged,
while safety plans occur without CPS agencies filing petitions outlining alleged
instances of abuse or neglect. Moreover, plea bargain discussions occur after a
defendant has retained or has been appointed a lawyer, and the prosecutor and
defense attorney negotiate a settlement based in large part on what would
likely happen if the case proceeded to trial.124 Meanwhile, safety plans occur
119. See id. at 762-63.
120. Compare id. at 762 (“It is not a forbidden means of ‘coercing’ a settlement to threaten

121.

122.

123.

124.

merely to enforce one’s legal rights.”), with id. (“Coercion is objectionable . . . when illegal
means are used to obtain a benefit. . . . There is no suggestion that the agency offers a
safety plan when it has no suspicion at all of neglect or abuse . . . .”).
Ryan Shellady criticizes Dupuy’s focus on the legitimacy of a state threat as “suggest[ing]
that parents looking down the barrel of the state’s gun ought to know whether its
chamber is loaded.” Shellady, supra note 14, at 1629.
Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 763 (citing Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2003); and Croft v.
Westmoreland Cty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1997)). At least
one reported case has applied Dupuy’s distinction between legitimate and legally
unjustifiable threats to recognize a valid procedural due process claim. Schulkers v.
Kammer, 367 F. Supp. 3d 626, 639-40 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (describing a CPS agency threat to
remove children if parents did not agree to safety plan as lacking a sufficient basis
in facts and law), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 19-5208, 2020 WL 1502446 (6th Cir.
Mar. 30, 2020).
Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 761. Cases in other circuits have relied on Dupuy’s analogy to civil
settlement. E.g., Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Dupuy,
465 F.3d at 761-62); Sangraal v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 3:11-cv-04884, 2013
WL 3187384, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2013) (citing Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 760-62), aff ’d mem.
sub nom. Jones v. City & County of San Francisco, 621 F. App’x 437 (9th Cir. 2015).
At least that is how plea bargaining ought to work. Deviations from this norm—such
as “take it or leave it” plea offers, or “meet ’em and plead ’em” practice—are rightly
criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Margareth Etienne, A Lost Opportunity for
Sentencing Reform: Plea Bargaining and Barriers to Effective Assistance, 68 S.C. L. REV. 467,
482-83 (2017) (describing “take it or leave it” plea offers as inducing fast plea bargains);
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Defense Attorney Bias and the Rush to the Plea, 65 U. KAN. L.
REV. 271, 295-96 (2016) (describing “meet ’em and plead ’em” practice).
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without either side having the benefit of counsel and therefore with a weaker
ability for the law and possible legal process to inform the safety plan.
Moreover, criminal defendants not only have the right to counsel, but are
protected from plea decisions that result from erroneous legal advice through
ineffective assistance of counsel cases.125 A judge conducts a colloquy with the
defendant to ensure the voluntariness of the plea; indeed, a typical question
includes whether anyone has threatened the defendant in order to induce the
plea.126 No such colloquy occurs with safety plans.
Civil pretrial settlements provide a closer, but still imperfect, analogy for
the Seventh Circuit. They also involve important due process protections: all
of the procedures of civil litigation, sometimes coupled with representation of
all parties.127 Moreover, they are typically negotiated over longer periods of
time, allowing for calmer deliberation than a threat to take custody might
permit.128
In contrast, hidden foster care cases are not just any civil cases. Rather,
they involve the fundamental liberty interest of parents in the “care, custody,
and control” of their children129 combined with state action intended to
effectuate infringement of that interest. Moreover, in the safety plan context,
the only check on an overbearing state agency is a parent’s willingness to say
no and insist on their day in court. And this decision cannot be separated from
its legal and social context. It is not a cocktail party in which a privileged host
offers a drink to a privileged guest. It occurs when a state agency with awesome
powers to destroy families and create new ones interacts with families largely
of low socioeconomic status, often with low social capital, and typically

125. See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968-69 (2017) (overturning a defendant’s

126.

127.

128.
129.

guilty plea based on incorrect legal advice about the immigration consequences of that
plea); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 174-75 (2012) (ruling for a defendant who declined
a plea offer based on incorrect legal advice and later faced more severe consequences
following trial); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012) (finding constitutionally
deficient performance when attorney failed to communicate a plea offer and the offer
lapsed as a result); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that the failure
to advise a client regarding the risk of deportation created by a plea bargain is
constitutionally deficient).
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2) (“Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the
court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea
is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in
a plea agreement).”).
There is generally no right to appointed counsel in most civil cases, but parties
frequently do have counsel or at least access to “self-help” centers to obtain basic
information about the law and legal process. See, e.g., Self-Help Centers, A.B.A.,
https://perma.cc/E78Z-SN4B (archived Feb. 12, 2020).
Shellady, supra note 14, at 1628-29.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion).
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without funds, counsel, or much education.130 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
noted the risk of error that can result from power imbalances between the state
and the disproportionately poor parents in contact with CPS agencies.131 Other
factors—such as a parent’s immigration status or disability—may exacerbate
this power imbalance further.132 In this context, without the procedural
protections held by criminal defendants or civil litigants, it is doubtful that
much meaningful negotiation occurs.133
Despite these concerns about Dupuy’s logic, several other federal courts
have ruled similarly.134 In Smith v. Williams-Ash, the Sixth Circuit rejected
David and Melody Smith’s claim that a safety plan shifting physical custody of
their children to family friends violated their procedural due process rights.135
Following CPS officials’ concern that the Smiths’ house was too “filthy” and
“clutter[ed]” to be safe, a social worker “persuaded the Smiths to consent to a
safety plan that removed the children.”136 The Smiths alleged they cleaned
their home and asked the CPS social worker what additional steps they needed
to take in order to regain custody of their children, and the worker added
requirements, “ignored their requests for information[,] and threatened to
permanently remove their children if they stopped cooperating.”137 CPS
authorities only permitted the children to return to their parents two days
130. See, e.g., Lucas A. Gerber et al., Effects of an Interdisciplinary Approach to Parental

131.
132.

133.
134.

135.
136.
137.

Representation in Child Welfare, 102 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 42, 42 (2019)
(describing poverty and related factors as affecting “[t]he vast majority of child welfareinvolved parents”); Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality
in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 385 (1999) (“In child welfare
cases, where the individual is pitted against the vast power and resources of the state,
the power imbalance is particularly extreme. And in the vast majority of cases, the fact
that the parent is female, poor, uneducated, and nonwhite, exacerbates this inherent
power disparity.”).
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-63 (1982).
See, e.g., ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., UNDERCOUNTED. UNDERSERVED.: IMMIGRANT AND
REFUGEE FAMILIES IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 3-5 (2006), https://perma.cc/UYL9FVED (describing immigrant families’ vulnerability in the child protection system);
Ella Callow, Maintaining Families When Parents Have Disabilities, 28 CHILD L. PRAC. 129,
129 (2009) (describing high removal rates from parents with disabilities).
See McGrath, supra note 95, at 666, 679.
E.g., Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 597-98 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming the dismissal
of civil rights litigation because parents “consented to the removal of their children
pursuant to a voluntary ‘safety plan’”); Sangraal v. City & County of San Francisco,
No. 3:11-cv-04884, 2013 WL 3187384, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2013) (holding that
voluntary consent to a safety plan would eliminate any constitutional claim), aff ’d
mem. sub nom. Jones v. City & County of San Francisco, 621 F. App’x 437 (9th Cir. 2015).
520 F.3d at 597-98.
Id. at 598.
Id. Smith was decided on summary judgment, so these allegations were assumed to be
true. Id. at 598-99.
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after the parents filed a federal lawsuit alleging a due process violation.138 The
Sixth Circuit emphasized written elements of the safety plan at issue, including
form language reciting that the parents’ “decision to sign this safety plan is
voluntary,” threatening that if parents “will not be able to continue following
the plan, [CPS] may have to take other action(s) to keep [their] child(ren) safe,”
and requiring parents to inform their caseworker if they decide not to abide by
the safety plan.139 Relying on that form language, the Sixth Circuit followed
Dupuy and concluded the custody change was voluntary.140
B. An Inherently Coercive Practice
In considering whether hidden foster care violates parents’ and children’s
due process rights, the stronger view is that even legally justified threats to
remove children are so coercive as to render involuntary any subsequent
parental agreements to change physical custody. This Subpart describes the
Third Circuit case law that so holds and offers additional reasons to consider
these agreements involuntary. As importantly, this Subpart notes the many
legal and policy questions that remain even if this view of the constitutional
issue prevails.
1.

Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Services

The Third Circuit stands apart from Dupuy through a decision that has
been understood to hold that safety plans based on a threat of child removal are
inherently coercive and thus require some due process protections. Croft v.
Westmoreland County Children & Youth Services involved a CPS investigation of
vague concerns that Henry and Carol Croft were abusing their four-year-old
daughter based on a child protection hotline call that the child “had recently
been out of the house naked, walked to a neighbor’s house, knocked on the
door, and told the neighbors that she was ‘sleeping with mommy and
daddy.’”141 The parents denied abuse and explained the conduct at issue, but the
CPS investigator gave the father “an ultimatum: unless he left his home and
separated himself from his daughter until the investigation was complete, she
would take [the child] physically from the home that night and place her in
foster care.”142
138. Id. at 599.
139. Id. at 598, 600.
140. Id. at 599-600; see also Teets v. Cuyahoga County, 460 F. App’x 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2012)

(applying Smith and Dupuy to hold that parents’ agreement to a safety plan was
voluntary).
141. 103 F.3d 1123, 1124 (3d Cir. 1997).
142. Id.
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The Third Circuit pointed to evidence that CPS authorities acted beyond
their legal authority. It held that an emergency removal was not justified on
the facts, which the court described as “a six-fold hearsay report by an
anonymous informant.”143 Absent stronger evidence, CPS authorities could not
lawfully remove a child, either directly or through a safety plan.144 Moreover,
one CPS witness had even testified the agency required that a “parent accused
of sexual abuse must prove beyond any certainty that there was no sexual
abuse before [the CPS worker] would be permitted to leave a child with his or
her parents.”145 This practice unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proving
parental unfitness from the state to the parent.146 And this unconstitutional
burden shift was evident in the record—the CPS investigator had testified that
she insisted on separating the father from his daughter despite admitting to
lacking enough evidence to determine if the Crofts had abused their daughter
and needing to investigate further.147 Croft could thus be read as consistent
with Dupuy—holding that the problem was not the safety plan itself, but the
CPS authorities’ lack of adequate evidence to justify their insistence on that
plan.
However, Croft also included a different key holding, which suggests that
no CPS threat of removal could lead to a truly voluntary safety plan. The
CPS agency gave the Crofts an “ultimatum,” which caused a “dilemma” for the
parents.148 And the court scoffed at the CPS defendants’ effort to describe the
parents’ subsequent actions as voluntary: “This notion we explicitly reject. The
threat that unless Dr. Croft left his home, the state would take his four-yearold daughter and place her in foster care was blatantly coercive. The attempt to
color his decision in this light is not well taken.”149 This language stands in
143. Id. at 1126.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 1125.
146. Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (providing that parents are presumed to

act in their children’s best interest); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1971) (holding
that “as a matter of due process of law, [a parent is] entitled to a hearing on [their]
fitness as a parent before [their] children [a]re taken from [them]”). State courts have
explicitly held that the “party seeking to interfere with” the fundamental right of
family integrity—in child protection cases, the state—bears the burden of proof. See, e.g.,
In re Juvenile Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313, 1323 (Conn. 1983). State statutes universally
impose on states the burden of proving that parents have abused or neglected their
children. Ashley J. Provencher, Josh Gupta-Kagan & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, The
Standard of Proof at Adjudication of Abuse or Neglect: Its Influence on Case Outcomes at Key
Junctures, 17 SOC. WORK & SOC. SCI. REV., no. 2, 2014, at 22, 27.
147. Croft, 103 F.3d at 1127.
148. Id. at 1125.
149. Id. at 1125 n.1; see also Pearson, supra note 14, at 856 (describing this “important aspect”
of Croft).
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marked contrast to Dupuy’s repeated use of the term “offer” to describe CPS
authorities’ conduct and the term “voluntary” to describe parents’ responses to
CPS demands. Academic commentators have echoed these concerns that CPS
agencies arrange hidden foster care through coercive threats of removal and
court action, describing parents’ decision to acquiesce to such agency threats as
“voluntary”—complete with scare quotes.150
Subsequent district court cases within the Third Circuit have interpreted
Croft to deem coercive any safety plan resulting from a CPS threat to
remove a child. For example, Starkey v. York County involved abuse and neglect
allegations that were supported by significantly more evidence than those in
Croft—to the point that the district court described the two cases as “entirely
distinguishable.”151 But the court understood Croft to have clearly established a
legal rule that does not depend on the strength of the state’s evidence of abuse—
“that coercing parents to sign a safety plan under threat that the county or state
will otherwise take emergency custody of their children raises procedural due
process concerns.”152 Responding to the CPS defendants’ reliance on Dupuy, the
trial court cited Croft’s dicta as foreclosing any argument that the safety plan
was voluntary.153 Another federal district judge has similarly held that Croft
“expressly rejected” any Dupuy argument that safety plans resting on threats to
remove a child were anything other than “blatantly coercive.”154
The dissent in Smith v. Williams-Ash uses Dupuy’s logic to show hidden
foster care can, in practice, be coercive. Judge Ronald Lee Gilman emphasized
that Dupuy rested on the conclusion that state authorities threatened only to
enforce their actual legal rights and did not threaten to take action without a
legal basis.155 He reasoned that specific statements from the CPS caseworker to
150. See Garlinghouse & Trowbridge, supra note 46, at 117; see also Sacha M. Coupet, What

151.
152.

153.
154.

155.

Price Liberty?: The Search for Equality for Kinship-Caregiving Families, 2013 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1249, 1256 (describing the Dupuy holding as something that “would surely
not be tolerated elsewhere”); McGrath, supra note 95, at 633, 677-81 (critiquing the
voluntariness analysis in Dupuy); Pearson, supra note 14, at 836-38 (critiquing safety
plans as not truly voluntary).
No. 1:11-cv-00981, 2012 WL 9509712, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2012).
Id. at *9. Because the plaintiffs alleged a violation of federal civil rights law and
defendants claimed qualified immunity, the plaintiffs had to show that a clearly
established federal right existed, and the court found such a right in Croft. Id.
Id. at *10-11.
E.g., Isbell v. Bellino, 962 F. Supp. 2d 738, 747 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting Starkey, 2012 WL
9509712, at *11). At least one trial court has held that Croft did not clearly establish a
procedural due process rule, but that holding depended on a narrow reading of what
constitutes a clearly established right and Croft ’s focus on substantive due process. See
Exel v. Govan, No. 1:12-cv-04280, 2016 WL 1118781, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2016), aff ’d,
708 F. App’x 82 (3d Cir. 2018).
See Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 601-02 (6th Cir. 2008) (Gilman, J., dissenting)
(citing Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 761-63 (7th Cir. 2006)).
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the parents—threatening that the “children [would not] come home, period,”
perhaps forever—go beyond a threat to enforce a valid legal right.156 Indeed,
the facts of Smith—in which CPS authorities permitted the children to return
merely two days after the parents filed a lawsuit challenging CPS’s actions—
“suggest[] that the agency may not have had good reason for continuing to
detain the children.”157
2.

Coercion in other bodies of law

Case law governing voluntariness in other contexts could also support
the view that threatening to remove children is inherently coercive. In a
different child protection context, the Supreme Court raised in dicta (but did
not decide) whether “supposedly ‘voluntary’ [foster care] placements are in fact
voluntary.”158 Cases beyond child protection provide additional support for the
conclusion that state actors threatening to take children into foster care is at
least sometimes grounds for finding subsequent actions by parents involuntary.
Police interrogation cases are particularly informative because both the
presentation of a safety plan and a police interrogation involve state actors
with massive power speaking to a person, typically unrepresented, under
suspicion and seeking cooperation—sometimes making some kind of threat to
induce that cooperation. Cases evaluating the voluntariness of criminal
suspects’ confessions have explored what amounts to an unconstitutional
threat and what constitutes a permissible warning of the consequences of a
suspect’s decisions.159 And the Supreme Court has held police threats to have
children “taken away” and placed with “strangers,” along with statements that a
parent “had better do what they told [them] if [they] wanted to see [their] kids
again,” are unduly coercive and render a subsequent confession involuntary.160

156. Id. at 602 (alteration in original).
157. Id. at 603.
158. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816, 834 (1977).

While related to the hidden foster care discussed in this Article, the practice of
voluntary foster care placement differs in that parents place children in state legal
custody, and the practice is generally subject to long-standing statutory regulation. E.g.,
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-a (McKinney 2019).
159. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court wrote that “any evidence that the accused was
threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant
did not voluntarily waive his privilege.” 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). In contrast, police
statements that certain decisions would or would not help suspects are not necessarily
viewed as threatening. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979) (concluding
that police “indicat[ing] that a cooperative attitude would be to [the] respondent’s
benefit” was not threatening).
160. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 531, 534 (1963). The officers “largely corroborated” this
account of events. Id. at 532. One subsequent lower court case held that a similar threat
footnote continued on next page
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As Katherine Pearson has argued, those holdings support the Croft conclusion
that threats to remove children if parents do not agree to hidden foster care
render any such agreement inherently suspect.161
Similar issues have arisen in Fourth Amendment search cases, with some
courts holding that threats to remove children at least sometimes render
consents to search involuntary. In United States v. Ivy, the Sixth Circuit held that
“hostile police action against a suspect’s family is a factor which significantly
undermines the voluntariness of any subsequent consent.”162 In Ivy, the “hostile
police action” included a law enforcement officer threatening to take the
suspect’s child into state custody if the suspect did not consent to a search of his
home, leading the court to declare the suspect’s consent was involuntary.163 In
United States v. Tibbs, an officer’s threat to call the CPS agency to remove a child
rendered the parent’s consent involuntary.164 Determining the voluntariness of
a search depends on the totality of the circumstances and thus depends on the
facts of particular cases.165 Some courts have held alleged threats do not
constitute coercion when, among other things, they are not explicit166 or the
threats accurately share law enforcement plans without other indicators of
coercion.167
3.

No prohibition on safety plans

Courts in the Third Circuit finding constitutional violations make clear
they do not prohibit CPS agencies from using safety plans to effectuate changes
in physical custody. Rather, they hold “a parent is entitled to some level of
procedural protection in order to challenge the alteration of their parental
rights, and that such opportunities must be provided in a meaningful and

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

to separate parent and child “for a while” rendered a resulting confession involuntary.
United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1981); see also United States v.
Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 408 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Certainly some types of police trickery can
entail coercion: consider a confession obtained because the police falsely threatened to
take a suspect’s child away from her if she did not cooperate.”).
See Pearson, supra note 14, at 836 & n.4 (describing the “voluntary label” as “often
misleading”).
165 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 402, 404.
49 F. Supp. 2d 47, 53 (D. Mass. 1999).
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
E.g., United States v. Henderson, 437 F. App’x 96, 99 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v.
Santiago, 428 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 272-73 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). The Seventh Circuit decided Miller four
months before Dupuy, in a decision by Judge Easterbrook who also sat on the Dupuy
panel.
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timely manner after the deprivation.”168 As with any procedural due process
violation, the remedy is not a prohibition on the practice, but more process.
Courts in the Third Circuit have not specified what process is required,169
leaving it to legislative and executive branches to determine in the first
instance what process would suffice, subject to future court challenges.170
An earlier Second Circuit case also demonstrates that procedural
protections can justify safety plans and kinship diversion. In Gottlieb v. County
of Orange, the court considered the procedural due process claim of a father
who CPS officials required, under threat of immediate removal of the children,
to leave his home pending an investigation into sexual abuse allegations.171
The Second Circuit acknowledged that the father suffered a substantive
deprivation, but noted that under the applicable local procedures, he could
have insisted upon judicial review of that deprivation at any time, and that he
had the opportunity to consult with an attorney before agreeing to give up
physical custody of his children.172
In sum, the coercive beginnings of hidden foster care cases raise profound
due process concerns; and this Article concludes that they likely violate
parents’ and children’s due process rights. Accordingly, one cannot escape the
need to outline a set of legal regulations to govern this practice. Before
outlining such regulations, a deeper exploration of the risks and benefits of
hidden foster care, and the regulatory and financial structures that lead to the
practice, is necessary.

168. E.g., Isbell v. Bellino, 962 F. Supp. 2d 738, 758 (M.D. Pa. 2013); cf. Starkey v. York County,

169.
170.

171.

172.

No. 1:11-cv-00981, 2012 WL 9509712, at *11-12 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2012) (describing the
law as preventing separation of parents and child “absent any procedural safeguards,”
and faulting CPS documents for “mak[ing] no mention of . . . the Plaintiffs’ rights” related
to the safety plan).
E.g., Starkey, 2012 WL 9509712, at *11-12.
These courts likely could order the state to provide some specific protections—for
instance, a procedure that permits a parent to challenge a safety plan within, say,
forty-eight hours. But courts’ holdings reflect an apparent preference to defer to
other branches of government to define specific procedures. Moreover, legislative and
executive branch regulation could lead to more comprehensive regulatory schemes.
Both points underscore that legislative and regulatory changes are necessary reforms,
even if courts uniformly followed the Croft analysis. Other scholars have also
concluded that, even with Croft, legislative changes are needed. See Pearson, supra
note 14, at 873; infra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
84 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1996). In Gottlieb, the father’s five-year-old daughter alleged
abuse, but later medical examinations led doctors to conclude that there was no
evidence of sexual abuse. Id. at 513, 515.
Id. at 522.
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III. Policy Concerns About and Justifications for Hidden Foster Care
Hidden foster care has elicited criticism from across the child protection
ideological spectrum. Those concerned about CPS agencies removing children
too frequently have litigated against the practice and written critically of its
implications for family integrity.173 Those concerned that CPS agencies defer
to family integrity too much have critiqued hidden foster care for leaving
children in what they see as unsafe situations without the safety precautions of
formal foster care.174 At the same time, there is an argument to be made for
hidden foster care in some situations—it is less legally invasive, it reduces the
risk of the state placing children in foster care with strangers, and it threatens
parents and children with less state intervention.
The comparative pros and cons of hidden foster care and formal kinship
foster care could lead some parents and kinship caregivers to seek one
option and others to seek the other—which raises the question of how these
individuals make these decisions. But the social work and think tank literature
gives reason for concern that CPS agencies do not provide caregivers or
parents with the information necessary to make those decisions and instead
effectively make those decisions for families. One recent think tank summary
concludes that “practice varies” and “families do not obtain consistent and
comprehensive information about the service and custody options available
during a family crisis,” and, in particular, that CPS caseworkers “infrequently”
tell kinship caregivers that formal foster care brings with it financial
assistance.175
A. Benefits of Hidden Foster Care and Downsides of Formal Kinship Care
Despite the concerns raised in Part III.B below, there are strong reasons
why some families might prefer informal changes in custody to avoid the formal
foster care system. Placing the child in CPS agency custody subjects the child
(and the kinship caregiver) to agency rules and supervision—something many
families “consider[] intrusive and not family-friendly.”176 Kinship caregivers
face a potential trade—they could receive foster care maintenance payments
and other support from the state CPS agency, but only in exchange for greater
oversight. Dorothy Roberts has argued that “transferring parental authority to
173. Diane Redleaf, then the director of the Family Defense Counsel, was counsel for the

plaintiffs in Dupuy and has written about that case and related safety plan issues.
REDLEAF, supra note 7, at 37-50. Other commentators have raised similar concerns. See,
e.g., Pearson, supra note 14, at 836; Shellady, supra note 14, at 1626-34.
174. Bartholet, supra note 15, at 1365-67.
175. MALM & ALLEN, supra note 39, at 3, 5-6.
176. Id. at 3.
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the state is the price poor people must often pay for state support of their
children.”177 Commentators have long critiqued public programs designed to
enhance poor families’ welfare as exercises in social control.178 In the CPS
context, family members may reasonably chafe at CPS agencies taking on
greater formal authority over their lives.179 For some, the financial benefits
will make this trade worth it, but for some they will not. Many families would
choose to forgo state assistance to avoid paying that price—but many would
also accept state aid even with that price.180
One particular concern is that the imposition of formal foster care
licensing requirements could prevent children from living with kin and
instead lead to stranger foster care. Foster care licensing typically imposes
multiple requirements that could disproportionately limit licenses for poor
families—such as minimum bedroom space requirements or limits on the total
number of children in a home,181 or criminal background checks.182 CPS
agencies may waive such requirements if they deem the standard to be “nonsafety” in nature.183 Thus, kinship families, who are disproportionately poor,
may reasonably fear they will face difficulty getting licensed. While CPS
agencies could license them even with some concerns,184 many parents and
kinship caregivers may (reasonably) not trust CPS agencies with that
discretion or be willing to risk that the children could end up with strangers
rather than in kinship foster care.
177. Roberts, supra note 36, at 1621.
178. E.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of

179.
180.

181.
182.

183.
184.

Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955, 959-61 (1991) (describing welfare policies relating to
single mothers as “social control” of those women and their families).
See McGrath, supra note 95, at 655-60 (describing parents’ distrust of and “feeling of
vulnerability” in the face of CPS authority).
See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 13, at 18; see also Coupet, supra note 150, at 1259;
McGrath, supra note 95, at 655-60; Dorothy E. Roberts, Essay, Child Welfare’s Paradox,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881, 892-93 (2007).
E.g., D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, §§ 6005.2-.3, 6007.16-.22 (2019).
When an adult applies for a license to be a foster parent in the formal foster care
system, all adults in their home must submit to criminal background checks, and rules
prohibit foster care licenses based on certain convictions, including any felony drug
conviction within the past five years, and require consideration of any other
conviction. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(A), (C) (2018). State and local licensing codes apply this
federal requirement. E.g., D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 6008.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10)(D).
Indeed, some evidence suggests that state practice in granting kinship waivers of foster
care licensing requirements varies widely. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STATES’ USE OF WAIVERS OF NONSAFETY LICENSING STANDARDS FOR RELATIVE FOSTER FAMILY HOMES 5-7 (2011),
https://perma.cc/DB8V-9K78 (reporting a widely varying frequency of CPS agencies
granting waivers and the actual number of children placed in formal kinship foster
care by state).
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A family court case and formal foster care bring with them certain other
risks, which parents or children might choose over the risks of hidden foster
care. The child’s fate will be up to a judge—who may be more or less favorable
to the parent than the agency. Removal into formal foster care also triggers a
timeline that can lead to termination of parental rights; states are often
required to seek such terminations when children have been in foster care for
fifteen months.185 Some state termination statutes authorize judges to
permanently sever the legal relationship between parents and children if the
problem leading to removal is not rectified on an even shorter timeline.186
B. Risks of Hidden Foster Care
Formal kinship foster care requires several steps that trigger family court
involvement, due process protections, and CPS agency support to and
oversight of kinship caregivers.187 In such cases, a CPS agency files a petition
alleging parents have abused or neglected their children, and convinces family
courts both that the petition is accurate and that the court should order that
custody of the children be transferred to the CPS agency.188 The agency then,
in the language of federal child welfare financing statutes, has “placement and
care” authority over the child.189 When the agency has identified a kinship
caregiver with whom it wishes to place the child, it can grant that caregiver a
foster home license and place the child in that home.190 The agency then has a
set of court-supervised obligations to affected children, parents, and kinship
caregivers. The agency must provide services to help the parent and child
reunify.191 The agency pays the kinship caregivers a foster parent subsidy (as it
does to any unrelated licensed foster parent), provides social work case
management and other services to the child, and oversees the placement to

185. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
186. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2570(2) (2019) (providing a six-month timeline).
187. For a summary of the procedures triggered by formal kinship foster care, compared

188.

189.
190.
191.

with the absence of such procedures in hidden foster care, see LEGISLATIVE AUDIT
COUNCIL, S.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, A REVIEW OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 53-56 (2014), https://perma.cc/7VGS-SUNG.
The Constitution requires states to give parents hearings on their fitness before
removing their children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972). States have codified
these requirements. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1660(A)-(E) (describing the process for
filing and adjudicating petitions alleging abuse or neglect).
42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(B).
E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2320 (describing kinship foster home licensing).
See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii).
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ensure it meets the child’s needs.192 The family court holds regular hearings
until the child has a permanent legal status—either by reunifying with parents or
by forming new permanent legal connections with a family through permanent
guardianship or adoption.193
All of those steps are missing from hidden foster care. This Subpart will
outline distinct policy concerns with the use of hidden foster care expressed
both by advocates for less state intervention in families and advocates for
greater intervention, as well as by advocates for kinship caregivers. In so doing,
this Subpart will also argue that advocates of different stripes all raise
legitimate concerns, as do those who argue that hidden foster care has benefits
in at least some cases. That nuanced view underscores the need for regulation
and the specific proposals in Part VI.
1.

Denial of court oversight

The absence of court oversight raises multiple significant concerns—both
the due process concerns discussed in Part II and several overlapping policy
concerns.
First, avoiding court proceedings removes an important opportunity to
provide a check on unnecessary removals. Hidden foster care happens when
CPS officials determine children cannot remain safely in their homes, and they
then catalyze a change in physical custody. There is good reason to think that
CPS officials often incorrectly determine a change in physical custody is
necessary and, absent court hearings to check such decisions, children are
unnecessarily separated from their parents. The most analogous decision in the
formal foster care system is whether CPS officials should remove children and
initiate court proceedings, and existing research demonstrates that CPS
agencies remove a large number of children only for them to return home in a
matter of days.194 Studying this phenomenon, Vivek Sankaran and Christopher
Church conclude many of these children should never have been removed at
all.195 Frequent errors in initial removal decisions have been documented in

192. See id. § 672(a)(1) (providing payments to licensed foster homes); id. § 675(1)(B)

(establishing “case plan” requirements, including providing “services . . . to the parents,
child, and foster parents”).
193. See id. § 675(5).
194. See Vivek S. Sankaran & Christopher Church, Easy Come, Easy Go: The Plight of Children
Who Spend Less than Thirty Days in Foster Care, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 207, 216-26
(2016).
195. Id. at 210. Sankaran and Church also question the effectiveness of family court checks
on agency removal. Id. While those checks could be strengthened, they are nevertheless
superior to the total absence of judicial checks as occurs in hidden foster care.
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multiple jurisdictions.196 The decision that a child has to be separated from a
parent is ripe for inaccuracy—it requires balancing multiple complex factors,
but typically must be made with incomplete and imperfect information.197 It is
thus unsurprising that errors related to hidden foster care are evident in some
court decisions.198
Recognizing the existence of such errors is essential for due process analysis.
Even those circuits rejecting due process concerns with safety plans do so on
the premise that CPS agencies must have a factual and legal basis for the threat
to remove the child or file a case asking a family court to order a removal.199
Recognizing a significant risk that CPS agencies may make errors in
determining when they can lawfully threaten to remove a child should lead to
significant skepticism about endorsing that practice without some judicial
check. In practice, CPS caseworkers often make that judgment on their own—
perhaps in consultation with a supervisor, but without any consultation
with a lawyer. Consider, for instance, the South Carolina CPS agency’s policy
196. See, e.g., Jessica Horan-Block & Elizabeth Tuttle Newman, Accidents Happen: Exposing

Fallacies in Child Protection Abuse Cases and Reuniting Families Through Aggressive
Litigation, 22 CUNY L. REV. 382, 384, 388-91 (2019) (describing such errors and
attorneys’ success in correcting them, leading to prompt reversals of child removals);
Kathleen B. Simon, Note, Catalyzing the Separation of Black Families: A Critique of Foster
Care Placements Without Prior Judicial Review, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 347, 358-59
(2018) (describing such findings in the District of Columbia); Ark. Div. of Children &
Family Servs., Title IV-E Waiver Demonstration Project Proposal (2012) (on file with
author) (acknowledging that many children who enter and leave foster care quickly
“should have never come into care” in the first place).
197. See Simon, supra note 196, at 361.
198. See, e.g., Schulkers v. Kammer, 367 F. Supp. 3d 626, 639-40 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (describing a
CPS agency’s threat to remove a child if the parents did not agree to a safety plan as
unsupported by facts and contrary to legal standards), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 195208, 2020 WL 1502446 (6th Cir. Mar. 30, 2020). As an illustration, consider South
Carolina Department of Social Services v. Wiseman, 825 S.E.2d 74 (S.C. Ct. App. 2019). In
that case, the CPS agency found no evidence to support physical abuse allegations. Id. at
75. Nonetheless, the CPS caseworker testified that upon the child’s release from a
psychiatric hospital, the agency “would have asked for relative placement until the
agency was able to complete its investigation.” Id. at 77. The court ruled that the parents
had not maltreated their child, id. at 76-77; as a result, insistence on a temporary
informal relative placement would not have been justified, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-71660(E) (2019) (requiring a finding that the child was mistreated before ordering a child
removed from the parents’ custody).
199. See, e.g., supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit noted that a
trial on the “administration of the safety plans”—not a facial challenge to their use—had
not yet occurred, and evidence of “misrepresentations or other improper means” by
CPS officials had not yet been produced. Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 763 (7th Cir.
2006). In one later case, the Seventh Circuit applied the rule stated in Dupuy, ruling that
the state CPS agency may have violated a family’s constitutional rights when it
allegedly insisted that parents sign a safety plan when it lacked legal authority to keep
the child in its custody. See Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 482-84 (7th Cir. 2011).
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manual. It requires caseworkers to consult with agency attorneys only when
they are preparing to file a petition, thus preventing any legal advice, even by
the agency’s own counsel, to caseworkers before they threaten to remove
children.200 Parents also generally lack counsel to advise them or challenge the
caseworker on the legal basis of the threat. Thus, all parties involved are flying
blind on an essential legal foundation of safety plans.
Second, due process checks in a court proceeding can provide a modest
correction to racial and economic disparities within the child protection
system and help limit the contribution of racial stereotypes or implicit or
explicit biases to removal decisions. A central concern regarding those disparities
is that high levels of discretion can permit implicit biases based on race, class,
sex, disability, or other characteristics to infect decisions—a particularly
significant concern given the imperfect information often available.201 Racial
disparities are particularly pronounced at these initial stages of a case,202
indicating a particular need for vigilance. Unchecked decisions can have more
disparities; Kathleen Simon concluded that reducing individual removal
discretion by limiting circumstances in which emergency removals are
permitted, and thus strengthening judicial review of postremoval decisions,
was correlated with reductions in racial disparities in removals.203
Third, court proceedings trigger statutory right-to-counsel laws in child
protection cases, ensuring the parents will have an attorney to aid them, not
only in challenging the state’s evidence but also in negotiating temporary or
permanent arrangements with CPS agencies and in advocating for prompt
reunifications.204
2.

Denial of reasonable efforts to reunify

The child protection system is intended to be rehabilitative—even when
the state must remove children from their parents, the law presumes reunifying
children with their parents will serve their best interest, and, indeed, reunification

200. Compare S.C. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 30, § 718 (requiring DSS attorney reviews

201.
202.

203.
204.

before initiating family court proceedings), with id. § 719.02 (making no reference to
legal review or consultation when initiating safety plans).
See Simon, supra note 196, at 362-63.
See id. at 354-55; see also CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
ISSUE BRIEF: RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN CHILD WELFARE 9 (2016),
https://perma.cc/DC9K-XFUF.
See Simon, supra note 196, at 375-85.
Most states provide parents with a categorical right to counsel, and the remainder
provide a discretionary or qualified right to counsel. See Status Map, NAT’L COALITION
FOR CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., https://perma.cc/UD92-SL28 (archived Feb. 12, 2020).
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is the most common means by which children leave foster care.205 But hidden
foster care exempts agencies from the core legal requirements to meet this
rehabilitative goal.
Child protection law furthers reunification through two core requirements:
first, that agencies make “reasonable efforts” to reunify parents and children;206
and second, that agencies work with families to develop individualized case
plans to aid rehabilitation and reunification.207 If a state removes a child due to
concerns arising from a parent’s substance abuse, a parent’s untreated mental
health condition, or a parent’s abusive partner, then the state must work to
connect the parent to appropriate services or find a way to protect the child
from the abusive partner so that the parent and child can reunite.208 Some
states have provided more explicit guidance.209
Crucially, the legal obligation to help reunite parents with their children is
triggered by placing children in foster care—thus, agencies avoid it by using
hidden foster care. Agencies must also make reasonable efforts to avoid
removing children from their parents,210 but that obligation is only adjudicated
if the agency brings the case to court, which an agency relying on hidden foster
care need not do. As at least one CPS agency has acknowledged explicitly, using
hidden foster care means the agency “has no further legal obligation to the
parent in terms of reunification.”211
In addition, when agencies bring a case to court and place a child in formal
foster care, they must craft case plans that include details of services to parents
“to improve the conditions in the parents’ home [and] facilitate return of the
child.”212 Case plans must describe “the appropriateness of and necessity for the
foster care placement.”213 Procedurally, CPS agencies must “develop[] [case
205. About half of all children leaving foster care do so via reunification. The next most

206.
207.
208.

209.

210.
211.
212.
213.

frequent outcome—adoption—accounts for 24% of children leaving foster care.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 16, at 3.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) (2018). Narrow exceptions to this requirement apply. See id.
§ 671(a)(15)(D).
Id. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(1).
See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REASONABLE EFFORTS
TO PRESERVE OR REUNIFY FAMILIES AND ACHIEVE PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN 2 (2019),
https://perma.cc/YQJ7-M2MY (describing common examples of reasonable efforts).
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 4-1301.02 (2019) (enumerating specific services as examples of
reasonable efforts); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.2 (2019) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-71640(A)(2) (2019) (requiring the CPS agency to ensure parents with disabilities receive
services tailored to their needs and abilities).
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i).
VA. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 89, at 5.
42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(1)(B).
See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g) (2019).
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plans] jointly with the parent(s) or guardian of the child.”214 Some state laws
provide further due process checks by requiring family courts to approve case
plans and providing for specific roles for parents and sometimes their
attorneys,215 as well as by adding substantive details to the types of services
that ought to be listed.216 These requirements, including the opportunity to
bring disputes to court, are not triggered when CPS agencies do not remove
children or file abuse or neglect petitions against their parents.
The loss of these two critical protections—reasonable efforts to reunify
and case planning obligations—is particularly acute when hidden foster care
lasts longer than a few days. Then the invasion of family integrity becomes
even more severe, and the need for a meaningful plan to resolve the case even
more important. When such separations are triggered by real concerns about
parents’ ability to raise their children, rehabilitation is crucial to address those
concerns. But the legal status of hidden foster care permits a CPS agency to
treat the case as lower priority—there is no legal obligation for the state to
develop a detailed case plan or provide rehabilitative services, and there is no
pending court hearing to prepare for and thus no moment when a judge will
question the agency’s efforts to prevent removal or reunify the child with their
parents.217 Moreover, the agency may perceive the child as stable in the
kinship caregiver’s home and thus deprioritize the case relative to others with
more pressing concerns.
The loss of reasonable efforts to reunify and related case planning duties is
even more acute when hidden foster care leads to long-term changes in
children’s custody, as it did in more than 60% of hidden foster care cases studied
in Texas—covering about 21,000 children in one year.218 It is reasonable to
wonder how many of those children and their parents might have been
reunified had these legal obligations applied.

214. Id. § 1356.21(g)(1).
215. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-3B-15(A), (C) (West 2019) (requiring the development of

case plans and the dissemination of such plans to all parties before a disposition
hearing); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-704(C) (2019) (requiring CPS agencies to obtain
signatures from parties and their counsel and creating court procedures to challenge
elements of case plans); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-205(1)-(4) (LexisNexis 2019)
(requiring the involvement of parents and others in developing case plans and
informing courts of disagreements regarding their contents).
216. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-3B-15(B); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-704(D)-(E); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 62A-4a-205(6).
217. See Pearson, supra note 14, at 848.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
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3.

Denial of services and financial support to kinship families

Much criticism of hidden foster care involves concerns about how it enables
CPS agencies to avoid providing financial and other services to kinship caregivers
that would be available were CPS agencies to take a more formal route.219
These critiques include calls for CPS agencies to enhance services and financial
support to kinship caregivers.220 Critics also worry that CPS agencies’ use of
hidden foster care is “motivated . . . by budget deficits and the desire to keep foster
care numbers low.”221
The most prominent illustration of this concern is how hidden foster care
enables CPS agencies to avoid their obligations to kinship caregivers in the
formal foster care system, particularly the provision of foster care maintenance
payments. The absence of such payments raises a particular concern that CPS
agencies are failing to support kinship caregivers (and children in their homes)
who in the aggregate tend to have lower incomes than nonkinship foster
parents.222 Hidden foster care thus denies financial assistance to families who,
in general, are most likely to need it. Kinship caregivers in these situations
have raised concerns about the absence of both foster care subsidies and related
services—such as automatically provided Medicaid cards and vouchers for
furniture and clothing to help take care of children.223 Other child welfare
services are also often available only to children in formal foster care (kinship
or otherwise) but not children in hidden foster care—including respite care224
219. See Ehrle et al., supra note 80, at 2 (“Many children in kinship foster care, therefore,

220.
221.
222.

223.
224.

may not be receiving the services needed to ensure the safety of their placements.”);
Walsh, supra note 78, at 2 (“Our findings point to the need to develop ways to better
support informal kin, especially among very poor households. . . . [K]in caregivers . . .
are less likely to receive services, including financial assistance, than other types
of substitute caregivers.”); see also Jill Duerr Berrick, Trends and Issues in the U.S.
Child Welfare System, in CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL TRENDS AND
ORIENTATIONS 17, 30 (Neil Gilbert et al. eds., 2011) (describing the “two-tiered system”
of care caused by “voluntary kinship care”); Coupet, supra note 150, at 1256 (noting that
kinship caregivers who take custody through hidden foster care “are deprived of all of
the support, services, and therapeutic resources that foster parents of children who are
adjudicated dependent would receive”).
See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 85, at 105-06.
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 13, at 7. Part IV will discuss in more detail financial
incentives for agencies to use hidden foster care.
See Riehl & Shuman, supra note 56, at 109, 111. This concern has attracted some media
attention. See, e.g., Katie O’Connor, “They Forgot About Us:” Thousands of Families Are
Doing the Same Work as Foster Parents in Virginia, Without the Support, VA. MERCURY
(June 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/U4N2-UUQB.
See Ofelia Casillas & Dahleen Glanton, Is DCFS Diverting Cases to Save Costs?, CHI. TRIB.
(Apr. 5, 2010), https://perma.cc/D3HQ-EF52.
See Roberts, supra note 36, at 1631 (noting that respite care “is often subsidized by the
state for foster parents”).
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or assistance with transportation to school.225 The absence of a change in legal
custody can also raise questions about kinship caregivers’ authority to make
health care, educational, or other decisions for children in their homes.
Defenders of hidden foster care justify denying these financial supports
because hidden foster care cases involve kinship caregivers, arguing that
people should take care of their kin “without compensation.”226 Indeed, the
wide scope of hidden foster care seems to suggest that states do not need to pay
kinship caregivers direct subsidies to recruit them to take care of their
relatives. The ability to recruit kinship caregivers is a different matter,
however, than the needs of those caregivers to provide for children brought
into their home through CPS agency action. Moreover, the purpose of foster
care maintenance payments as established by Congress and described by the
Supreme Court focuses on children’s needs, not perceived kinship duties.227
That legal standard asks what financial and other supports are necessary to
help raise a child, especially a child who may have been traumatized by past
abuse or neglect or by the CPS-induced move to live with kin.
4.

Potential safety risks to children of hidden foster care

Hidden foster care can also leave children in danger that the formal foster
care system could mitigate. Kinship foster families typically facilitate more
informal visitation between parents and children than does placement with
strangers.228 That is normally a good thing, but it can be dangerous when
parents are dangerous to children. Family court and agency oversight of
kinship foster homes can help protect against such dangers in formal kinship
care cases through visitation orders and oversight of kinship placements—steps
absent in hidden foster care cases.229 Moreover, hidden foster care does not
involve any change in legal custody, so a parent has every legal right to take
the child at any time. When parents pose an immediate physical danger to
children, hidden foster care provides at most weak protection.
Moreover, hidden foster care may lead CPS agencies to approve children
living with kin who could provide an unsafe home. Think tanks that have
surveyed caseworkers found a dearth of policies regarding how to determine
the safety of potential kinship homes and “inconsistent” guidance to individual
caseworkers.230 Surveys of CPS state agencies reveal that most, but not all,
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(A) (2018) (making federal financial assistance available for foster
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

children to obtain transportation to school).
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 13, at 5-6.
See infra text accompanying notes 266-69.
Riehl & Shuman, supra note 56, at 110.
LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, supra note 187, at 53-56.
MALM & ALLEN, supra note 39, at 4.
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require kinship caregivers to undergo a background check, but this is less than
a full kinship licensing assessment.231 Overly rigid rules could screen out
perfectly safe kinship caregivers, but removing too many safety checks could
leave children vulnerable to further maltreatment.
Given these concerns, Elizabeth Bartholet—an advocate for more state
intervention to protect children who opposes more family preservation
efforts—has written critically of the “stunning” scope of hidden foster care and
its possible harmful results.232 “Surely a child-friendly system would question
such a massive diversion program and insist at a minimum on research
assessing how children do in such informal, uncompensated, and unsupervised
kinship care as compared to formal foster care.”233 Other critics have raised
concerns that the more modest assessment of informal kinship caregivers
(compared with kinship foster caregivers) may lead “[o]verworked agents [to]
save time and resources by placing children with relatives” outside of foster
care and court oversight.234 These concerns are reflected in data from Texas’s
hidden foster care system. Texas authorities found that when they closed
hidden foster care cases with children still living with kinship caregivers who
lacked legal custody, children were deemed to be victims of later abuse or
neglect at higher rates than other children in kinship placements.235
IV. Follow the Money: Federal Funding and Perverse Incentives
Effectively regulating hidden foster care requires an understanding of the
existing federal funding structures and how they create incentives for state
CPS agencies to use the practice. Many of the practices that CPS agencies avoid
by using hidden foster care236 are connected to federal child protection funding
and, more specifically, requirements states must meet to access that funding.
This Part will explore how the federal child protection funding system
contained in Title IV-E of the Social Security Act237 (known in the field simply
as “Title IV-E”) creates a perverse incentive to avoid all of these costs. Under
our existing federal funding scheme, hidden foster care allows CPS agencies to
effectuate the change of children’s custody from parents to kinship caregivers
on the cheap.
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 67, at 13.
See Bartholet, supra note 15, at 1367.
Id.
Naomi Schaefer Riley, Reconsidering Kinship Care, NAT’L AFF. (Summer 2018),
https://perma.cc/Q9B9-PAR8.
235. CHILDREN’S COMM’N, supra note 63, at 13.
236. See supra Part III.B.
237. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679c (2018).
231.
232.
233.
234.
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In explaining the incentives to use hidden foster care, this Part offers an
adjustment to the occasional claim that the federal financing system
“encourage[s] agencies to separate families” through formal foster care.238 Federal
funding structures provide partial federal reimbursement to state CPS agencies
for the costs of providing for children in foster care and thus make foster care
cheaper for states than it otherwise would be and, more specifically, make foster
care for Title IV-E-eligible families—that is, poor families239—less expensive
than it is for ineligible families. Nonetheless, there is a difference between
making foster care less expensive and making it more financially appealing
than other options; foster care remains an expensive enterprise, so avoiding
foster care altogether remains cheaper for state agencies. While much could be
said to critique foster care financing policies—for instance, that these policies
make it cheaper to remove poor children, support too many services for
children in foster care rather than services to prevent abuse and neglect, or
otherwise prevent the need for foster care—the financial incentives remain to
avoid foster care, especially because Title IV-E requires states to take on certain
expenses when they use formal foster care. CPS agencies thus have strong
financial incentives to use hidden foster care—they do not need to pay foster
care subsidies and do not need to provide as many services to children and
families.240
238. Simon, supra note 196, at 360; see also Pimentel, supra note 54, at 271 (“The greatest

incentive for CPS to remove children is the resulting financial benefit associated with
foster care under [Title IV-E].”).
239. For the state to be eligible to receive Title IV-E funds in individual foster care cases, the
child removed by the state and placed in foster care must be from a family that would
have been eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), as it existed in
1996 before welfare reform (which converted AFDC into Temporary Aid to Needy
Families) took effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(3).
240. A related issue is whether hidden foster care could absolve state agencies from liability
if children faced harm in kinship care. When the state takes custody of a person, that
triggers a constitutional obligation “to assume some responsibility for his safety and
general well-being.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
199-200 (1989). CPS agencies could plausibly argue that because they do not take legal
custody of a child in hidden foster care, this practice does not trigger such liability. If
accurate, that would add an additional financial and legal incentive to use that practice.
However, CPS agencies likely would be liable even in hidden foster care cases because
the state role in arranging hidden foster care placements could be viewed as a statecreated danger; if a kinship placement in hidden foster care creates a danger for the
child, the state created the danger by arranging the placement. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95
F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-201 (distinguishing cases
in which the state had a role in the “creation” of dangers); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d
616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (“If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private
persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely
passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.”). A
full analysis of whether the frequently applied test for determining if a state-created
danger exists, e.g., Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208-09, is met in hidden foster care cases is beyond
the scope of this Article.
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A. Child Welfare Federal Financing Overview
Removing children and placing them in foster care triggers a range of
costs to states: payments to foster parents to take care of the children, services
for the children and their parents to facilitate reunification, and costs associated
with court hearings to adjudicate CPS agency petitions alleging abuse and
neglect and obtain a court order changing custody to the agency.241 A partial
accounting of these costs—including payments to foster parents and some
services for children in addition to agency administrative costs, but excluding
reunification services for parents—reveals an average annual cost of more than
$25,000 per child in foster care.242
The federal government partially reimburses state CPS agencies for many
of these costs through Title IV-E. That exercise of federal spending power
accounts for a significant proportion of child protection spending—federal
spending accounts for about 45% of overall child protection spending (nearly
$13 billion annually), and Title IV-E accounts for the largest share of that
federal funding (about $6.5 billion annually).243 This substantial federal financial
commitment provides the federal government—both Congress and the Children’s
Bureau, a subdivision of the Department of Health and Human Services that
administers child welfare funding—substantial influence over state child welfare
policy decisions.
Importantly, Title IV-E focuses largely on what happens after CPS agencies
remove a child and open a court case—thus foster care is necessary to trigger
most federal child protection funding as well as the conditions the federal
government imposes on states to receive that money. In particular, Title IV-E
requires states to pay foster care maintenance payments including subsidies to
foster parents, offering partial federal reimbursement for those costs,244 and
requires states to operate a case review system including regular court hearings
for foster children.245 These obligations to kinship caregivers are triggered
241. Federal spending statutes require states to take these steps as a condition of receiving

242.
243.
244.
245.

federal funding. See 42 U.S.C. § 672 (providing foster care maintenance payments); id.
§ 671(a)(15)(B) (conditioning those payments on “reasonable efforts” being made to
“reunify families”); id. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(5)(B) (calling for a “case review system” including
regular court reviews). Some steps are required as a matter of constitutional law:
Due process requires states to provide parents with a hearing on their fitness before
removing children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
Nicholas Zill, Better Prospects, Lower Cost: The Case for Increasing Foster Care Adoption,
ADOPTION ADVOC. 3 (May 2011), https://perma.cc/PP67-7CCG.
Child Trends, How States Fund Child Welfare Activities 1 (2016),
https://perma.cc/2BQA-75KF.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(1), 672(a).
States must hold court or administrative reviews at least every six months, id. § 675(5)(B),
and court reviews at least every twelve months, id. § 675(5)(C).
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by transferring “placement and care . . . responsibility” to a state child welfare
agency.246 In contrast, if children remain in a kinship caregiver’s informal
custody via a safety plan, then these obligations do not exist. In addition to
these substantive obligations triggered by removing children and placing them
in formal foster care, Title IV-E imposes administrative requirements on CPS
agencies—at least when they use formal foster care.247
In 2018, Congress acted to permit states greater flexibility in using federal
funds to prevent the need for foster care rather than insisting that CPS agencies
go to court and remove children. The Family First Prevention Services Act,
discussed in more detail below, provides states that meet certain conditions
the ability to use Title IV-E funds for prevention efforts.248 This Article will
discuss whether Congress’s means of achieving that goal risk incentivizing
greater use of hidden foster care.249
Congress’s action responded to concern that Title IV-E focused too much on
foster care spending and not enough on prevention of abuse or neglect, or on
alternatives to foster care. Some have even suggested that Title IV-E federal
funding incentivized removing children.250 That overstates the financial dynamic.
Title IV-E provides federal funding only for eligible children251—and only about
half of children in foster care are eligible.252 Moreover, even for eligible children,
federal funds only cover a portion of costs.253 The costs of foster care, however,
generally apply to all children in the formal system; states provide foster
care maintenance payments to families even if they do not qualify for Title
IV-E reimbursement.254 Thus, on average, state and local CPS agencies still

246. Id. § 672(a)(2)(B).
247. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
248. See infra Part V.A.2.

See infra Part V.A.2.
E.g., Simon, supra note 196, at 360-61.
See 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)-(b).
KRISTINA ROSINSKY & SARAH CATHERINE WILLIAMS, CHILD TRENDS, CHILD WELFARE
FINANCING SFY 2016: A SURVEY OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES 16
(2018), https://perma.cc/7LY9-ZBVH.
253. The state-specific percentage covered by the federal government and by each state is
calculated by the same formula used to calculate federal Medicaid funding to states. 42
U.S.C. § 674(a)(1) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b)). That formula varies between 50% and 83%
federal reimbursement, determined by the state’s relative wealth as measured by its per
capita income, such that poor states receive a higher federal reimbursement rate than
rich states. Id. § 1396d(b) (cited in 42 U.S.C. § 674(a)(1)).
254. See, e.g., D.C. CHILD & FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY, RESOURCE PARENT HANDBOOK: WHAT
RESOURCE PARENTS SHOULD KNOW BEFORE A CHILD IS PLACED IN THEIR CARE AND HOME
93-95 (2018), https://perma.cc/6T9D-QFXC (describing foster care board rates and
their calculation without reference to Title IV-E eligibility).
249.
250.
251.
252.
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bear the majority—57%, according to a recent estimate—of total costs for foster
care.255
B. Miller v. Youakim and Payments in Formal Foster Care
Title IV-E’s incentives for states to avoid formal kinship foster care’s costs
are ironically strengthened by case law limiting states’ efforts to provide less
financial support to formal kinship foster families than to stranger foster
families. CPS agencies had long sought to arrange for formal kinship foster
care at low cost—that is, without paying the same subsidies that agencies pay
nonkinship foster parents. The Supreme Court rejected these efforts in 1979
in Miller v. Youakim, insisting that CPS agencies pay kinship and nonkinship
foster homes the same subsidies.256 While the Court was right on the statutory
interpretation question and right to push against state efforts to provide
formal kinship foster care on the cheap, this decision made the difference
between formal kinship foster care and hidden foster care even greater. Miller
thus strengthened a perverse incentive: The only way for CPS agencies to
avoid paying kinship caregivers is to avoid licensing them as foster parents.
Miller v. Youakim challenged an Illinois policy that excluded children
living with related foster parents from the state’s foster care funding.257 The
state CPS agency placed two foster children with their adult sister and her
husband, Linda and Marcel Youakim, after determining that the Youakims’
home met state foster home licensing standards.258 The agency had previously
placed the children in nonkinship foster homes and paid $105 per month per
child to the foster care providers.259 But when it moved the children to the
Youakims, it refused to pay the same rate, asserting that because theirs was
a kinship placement, it did not count as foster care, citing an Illinois law
definition of a “foster family home” as limited to adults providing a home to
children who were not related.260 The state did pay the Youakims $63 per child
per month in welfare benefits—40% less than the state paid nonkinship foster
parents.261
The Supreme Court held that the federal funding statute prevented states
from treating kinship foster families differently from other foster families.262
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

ROSINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 252, at 4.
440 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1979).
Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 130-31.
See id. at 131.
Id. at 133.
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The federal statutory definition of “foster family home” made no mention of
the kinship status of any foster family, requiring only that the CPS agency
license their home.263 Other provisions of the statute required states to pay
foster care maintenance payments for children “in the foster family home of
any individual,” providing no distinction between kinship and nonkinship
foster care.264 The conclusion is straightforward—once a state gave foster care
licenses to kinship caregivers and placed children with those caregivers
following a family court order to remove the children from their parents,265
the state had to pay kinship caregivers the full foster care subsidy.
The Miller Court envisioned a foster care system in which any time a child
needed to be removed from their parents, the state would financially support
whomever it placed the child with via foster care payments commensurate
with the child’s anticipated needs, and all such removals would be reviewed by
a family court judge to provide a meaningful due process check. That is, the
Court emphasized the importance of two features of kinship foster care that
are lacking in hidden foster care.
Miller also described foster care maintenance as payments to meet
children’s needs rather than based on any perceived obligation that family
members could have toward children in their extended family.266 The Court
emphasized Congress’s determination that trauma endured by children in
foster care led to a “need for additional . . . resources—both monetary and service
related—to provide a proper remedial environment” for abused and neglected
children.267 That is why Congress increased the payments for foster children
above those made via welfare payments—“to meet the special needs of
neglected children[, which] cost more than basic . . . care.”268 This view of foster
care maintenance payments has been strengthened in the intervening years as
Congress has defined foster care maintenance payments as those necessary to
pay for a list of needs of children in foster care.269 Foster care maintenance
payments exist, therefore, to meet the presumptively significant needs of foster
children. They do not exist to provide financial incentives to recruit foster
parents. If it were the latter, one could justify (at least on policy grounds)
paying a lower rate to kinship foster parents, who largely agree to take in a
263. Id. at 135 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1976)).
264. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (1976)).
265. Miller made clear that these other criteria were necessary to trigger a state’s obligation
266.
267.
268.
269.

to pay foster care maintenance payments. See id. at 134-35.
See id. at 138-45.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 143.
See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, sec. 101(a)(1),
§ 475(4), 94 Stat. 500, 510 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(A) (2018)).
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child because of their already existing relationship with the child or the child’s
parent and thus may need less of a financial incentive to agree to take that step.
The Miller Court also emphasized the essential role of judicial findings in
justifying removing children from parents and placing them with anyone
else—and it presciently feared that permitting states to treat kinship foster
families differently from nonkinship foster families could erode this essential
due process check. The federal foster care financing system required judicial
approval before states could make (and seek partial federal reimbursement for)
foster care maintenance payments.270 But if states could exclude kinship
placements from those requirements, the Court feared
the State would have no obligation to justify its removal of a dependent child if he
were placed with relatives, since the child could not be eligible for Foster Care
benefits. But the same child, placed in unrelated facilities, would be entitled under
the Foster Care program to a judicial determination of neglect. The rights of
allegedly abused children and their guardians would thus depend on the
happenstance of where they are placed . . . .271

All children—even those placed with kin—deserve “protect[ion] from unnecessary
removal.”272
The irony of Miller v. Youakim, therefore, is that its decision rested precisely
on the concerns triggered by states’ use of hidden foster care. At the same time,
by rejecting states’ efforts to make formal kinship care less expensive than
foster care, Miller strengthened the distinction between informal and formal
kinship care and thus created stronger financial incentives for states to use
informal arrangements.273
Given those incentives, it is not surprising that Miller did not lead Illinois
to treat kinship caregivers equally to nonkinship foster parents. Indeed,
Illinois—the state whose discrimination against kinship foster placements the
Court rejected in Miller—today offers a leading example of prevalent hidden
foster care. It is the state that gave rise to the Dupuy litigation, and its frequent
use of hidden foster care has been documented in the years after Miller.274

See Miller, 440 U.S. at 134, 139.
Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 140.
To be clear, I do not suggest that the Court decided Miller incorrectly; quite the
contrary. Rather, I suggest that additional regulation of hidden foster care is necessary
to prevent the apt fears that Miller articulated from continuing.
274. See supra text accompanying note 88. The Chicago Tribune documented at least a
“handful” of probate court cases—which could shift custody from a parent to a kinship
caregiver—involving families willing to state to a reporter that the CPS agency pushed
them toward hidden foster care instead of filing a juvenile court case. Casillas &
Glanton, supra note 223.
270.
271.
272.
273.
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* * *
One important issue related to Miller v. Youakim remains subject to
inconsistent application around the country—whether kinship foster parents
have a private right of action to enforce their right to equal treatment in
federal court. Three circuits have ruled kinship foster parents do have a private
right of action.275 The Eighth Circuit, however, has taken a different path—
holding that foster parents lack a private right of action to challenge the
amount of foster care maintenance payments from the state.276 Like Miller, the
majority rule appears correct on the individual facts and in its application of
the test for private rights of action,277 but it risks strengthening incentives to
avoid formal foster care altogether—states could avoid federal courts forcing
them to pay equal foster care subsidies to kinship caregivers by arranging for
the child to go to kin via hidden foster care.
C. Hidden Foster Care’s Cost Advantages to State CPS Agencies
Families with hidden foster care cases are not entirely without state
support. Two points, however, are essential for comparing this support with
that of the formal foster care system. First, from the perspective of kinship
caregiving families, the support is substantially less generous financially, as the
facts of Miller illustrate. Kinship caregivers who have physical custody of
children can obtain public benefits to help take care of those children through
Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF).278 While such benefits surely help,
they are quite modest in comparison to foster care subsidies.279 Thus, to
kinship caregivers, there is a significant financial difference between informal
kinship care through safety plans and formal kinship foster care through a
family court action initiated by a CPS agency.
Second, from the perspective of state agencies, this federal support does
not require a state match—that is, it is essentially free to state agencies,
compared to any formal foster care intervention, which, as discussed above,
requires sizable state matches. While federal funds only partially reimburse
275. See N.Y. State Citizens’ Coal. for Children v. Poole, 922 F.3d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 2019), cert.

276.
277.
278.
279.

denied, 140 S. Ct. 956 (2020); D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2017); Cal. State
Foster Parent Ass’n v. Wagner, 624 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2010).
See Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, 712 F.3d 1190, 1203 (8th Cir.
2013).
That test, and a full analysis of the competing cases, is beyond the scope of this Article.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., KINSHIP CAREGIVERS AND
THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 5, 10 (2016), https://perma.cc/VL9W-T7LM.
Roberts, supra note 36, at 1626-27. In Virginia, for instance, one kinship family receives
$247 per month for two children, compared with potential foster care subsidies
between $470 and $700 per child. O’Connor, supra note 222.
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states for foster care subsidies,280 TANF funds come as federal block grants to
states that do not require state matching funds for each new case, so adding a
child in hidden foster care to the state’s TANF rolls does not add to state
costs.281 So a CPS agency that steers a child into hidden foster care can also help
that family obtain TANF benefits at no cost to the agency.
Worryingly, using TANF for kinship caregivers diverts TANF funds from
other impoverished families. TANF block grants have a fixed value,282 so
allocating those funds is a zero-sum game; giving those funds to a kinship
caregiver diminishes TANF funds available for all other purposes. That result
is especially concerning given the availability of an alternative funding stream
(Title IV-E) to at least partially support kinship caregivers who could be in the
formal foster care system.283
* * *
Putting the pieces of child protection financing together reveals a clear
fiscal conclusion: Formal kinship foster care is significantly more expensive
for states than hidden foster care, so state CPS agencies have strong financial
incentives to use hidden foster care. Going to family court and obtaining legal
custody of a child triggers a range of costs to and legal obligations on CPS
agencies. While federal funds will help CPS agencies pay those costs, those
agencies will be left with significant financial obligations, possibly for a long
time. In contrast, hidden foster care is cheaper overall (with no foster care
subsidies or family court costs), and federal financing systems make it even
cheaper for CPS agencies because no state funding is required for TANF grants
to hidden foster care kinship caregivers.
States are conscious of these incentives—indeed, any rudimentary child
protection agency budgeting process would account for these funding differences.
And CPS agencies have explicitly noted the cost. Consider South Carolina,
which, as noted above, frequently uses hidden foster care.284 When a state
280. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
281. States do have a maintenance-of-effort requirement, which replaced a matching fund

obligation. See GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32748, THE TEMPORARY
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) BLOCK GRANT: A PRIMER ON TANF FINANCING
AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 5-6 (2017), https://perma.cc/Y9CG-6WYD. States must
therefore spend a certain amount of money on various TANF-related activities in
order to access federal TANF block grants. This structure creates a different incentive
in individual cases. Adding an individual child to the state’s TANF rolls does not add
new state costs: The state will have already arranged for its maintenance-of-efforts
obligations, and no state matching funds will be required. That contrasts with using
formal foster care, which, even if the child is eligible for Title IV-E, will trigger a
requirement that the state pay matching funds. See id.
282. See id. at 4-5 (describing TANF block grants as “fixed,” with only narrow exceptions).
283. See supra text accompanying note 243.
284. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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legislative audit recommended eliminating hidden foster care and applying
“similar oversight by the family court and [CPS agency]” whenever abuse or
neglect leads CPS to facilitate a relative placement,285 the CPS agency responded
with a thinly veiled focus on costs and impacts on the state’s bottom line:
“Before mandating a probable cause hearing and court oversight for all
alternative caregiver cases, the General Assembly should consider the impact
on” the Department of Social Services.286
V. Institutionalizing Without Strongly Regulating Hidden Foster Care
Following legal developments since 2008, hidden foster care is now more
institutionalized and financially supported than ever before—but is not
significantly more regulated. In 2008, Congress added provisions to Title IV-E
that both implicitly recognized the hidden foster care system and provided
federal financial support for it. In 2018, Congress added further provisions
more directly recognizing and funding hidden foster care. In the same time
period, state efforts to codify the practice have grown. Recent statutory
enactments provide, at most, minimal regulation of hidden foster care, so their
greatest impact is to codify the practice. Similarly, some states have adopted
policies that impose minimal limits on hidden foster care. The overall trend,
therefore, is that new statutes and policies have institutionalized the practice
without imposing much regulation on it.
A. Federal Statutes
Two federal funding statutes now provide financial support for state CPS
agency action in hidden foster care cases.
1.

2008: Kinship navigator programs

Congress first recognized—however indirectly—hidden foster care when it
created “kinship navigator” grants in 2008.287 These grants were intended to
help state CPS agencies connect kinship caregivers to non-Title IV-E services
and supports outside of formal foster care and thus prevent the use of foster
care.288 These grants were explicitly for “children who are in, or at risk of
285. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, supra note 187, at 56.
286. Letter from Amber E. Gillum, Acting State Dir., S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., to Perry K.

Simpson, Dir., Legislative Audit Council 7 (Oct. 2, 2014), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AUDIT
COUNCIL, supra note 187, at 65.
287. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110351, sec. 102(a), § 427, 122 Stat. 3949, 3953-56 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 627 (2018)).
288. See 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(1).
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entering, foster care.”289 With the vast majority of children in kinship care
living outside of the formal foster care system, some kinship care advocates
saw those grants as an opportunity to support children living with kin outside
of family court jurisdiction, including through “diversion practices where
child welfare services utilize kin as a nonfoster care resource.”290 These grants
also served to address one (and only one) of the policy concerns discussed in
Part III—the lack of support and services to support kinship caregivers.291
The statute creating these grants said nothing explicitly about hidden
foster care. States have used kinship navigator grants to help connect kinship
caregivers to TANF and other public benefits to help them take care of
children informally in their care.292 Some of these kinship caregivers had
obtained physical custody of children with no CPS agency involvement and
thus did not form part of hidden foster care.293 But some kinship navigator
programs explicitly sought to “place the children with suitable kin caregivers”—
that is, operate a small hidden foster care system and use kinship navigator
funds to help kinship caregivers after CPS agencies effectuated a change in
custody to them.294 Indeed, a study of the first states to receive kinship
navigator grants identified three that focused on kinship caregivers outside of
formal foster care—and grant-funded work in all three states included a

289. Id. § 627(a) (emphasis added).
290. Wallace & Lee, supra note 45, at 418-19.
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NO. ACYF-CB-

PI-18-05, FISCAL YEAR 2018 FUNDING AVAILABLE FOR DEVELOPING, ENHANCING OR
EVALUATING KINSHIP NAVIGATOR PROGRAMS 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/52WX-ZRUK
(reporting that the Children’s Bureau had funded twenty kinship navigator programs,
including seven focusing specifically on “improving coordination between Child
Welfare and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) agencies to better
support families providing kinship care”); CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS: TITLE IV-E FLEXIBLE FUNDING; CHILD WELFARE
WAIVER DEMONSTRATIONS 18 (2011), https://perma.cc/J7MH-NJKK (describing the efforts
of the kinship navigator program in Ohio); JAMES BELL ASSOCS., FAMILY CONNECTION
DISCRETIONARY GRANTS: 2009-FUNDED GRANTEES; CROSS-SITE EVALUATION REPORT—
FINAL, at viii, 24 (2013), https://perma.cc/7BD7-XR5Q (reporting that kinship navigator
programs provided “information and referral” regarding “existing programs and
services to meet caregiver needs”).
293. JAMES BELL ASSOCS., supra note 292, at 156 (describing the population served as
including informal kinship caregivers with the “potential” of child welfare system
involvement but who had not yet had such involvement).
294. Id. at 25. The impact of this practice is evident in the short time frame many kinship
caregivers served by kinship navigator programs had had physical custody of
children—nearly half in South Carolina, for instance, had been kinship caregivers for
less than three months. Id.
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significant portion of children “diverted” from foster care to informal kinship
care.295
Kinship navigator programs’ wide eligibility standards also helped CPS
agencies work with families involved in hidden foster care. CPS agencies could
use federal kinship navigator funds for these purposes for any family,
regardless whether the family would be otherwise eligible for Title IV-E
services.296 That broader eligibility enables CPS agencies to use the funds to
serve families regardless of income, contrasting with Title IV-E support for
formal kinship foster care, which is limited to children from families who
meet very low poverty thresholds.297 That contrast strengthens the financial
incentives for CPS agencies to use hidden foster care: CPS agencies can get
federal financial assistance for providing any child in hidden foster care with
kinship navigator services, but receive federal support for only some children
whom they place in formal kinship foster care.
This Article does not intend to criticize kinship navigator programs.
Indeed, some evidence exists suggesting that they have both helped kinship
caregivers obtain legal custody and reunified children with parents, rather
than making them live in limbo with kinship caregivers, all while protecting
children’s safety.298 Rather, this Article asserts that kinship navigator
programs support hidden foster care without regulating that practice by
providing a relatively easy and federally funded mechanism to better support
kinship caregivers—with no corresponding requirement or support for efforts
to address other concerns about hidden foster care. Virginia’s experience
illustrates this concern. Charged by the legislature with reviewing its hidden
foster care practices, the state CPS agency noted the practice was “widespread”
and raised concerns that the practice was sometimes implemented poorly.299
But the agency’s recommendations were all about better supporting kinship
caregivers, including through the creation of a kinship navigator program.300
The agency made no recommendations regarding how to ensure hidden foster
295. Gerard Wallace, Summary Article, Diversion from Foster Care and Informal Kinship

296.

297.
298.
299.
300.

Families, in KINSHIP NAVIGATORS: PROFILES OF FAMILY CONNECTIONS PROJECTS FROM
2012 TO 2015, at 113, 114-15 (Gerard Wallace et al. eds., 2015). Wallace is the program
director of the kinship navigator program of one of those three states (New York). NYS
Kinship Care Staff, N.Y. STATE KINSHIP NAVIGATOR, https://perma.cc/6YL7-VASC
(archived Feb. 12, 2020).
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NO. ACYF-CB-PI-18-11,
REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE TITLE IV-E KINSHIP NAVIGATOR PROGRAM 3
(2018), https://perma.cc/759S-RGTT.
See supra note 239.
See JAMES BELL ASSOCS., supra note 292, at ix, 33-41.
VA. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 89, at 1, 4-5.
See id. at 2, 17-18.
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care was only used when necessary and was truly entered into voluntarily; nor
did it require the agency to work to reunify families when using hidden foster
care.301
2.

2018: The Family First Act

While Title IV-E funding primarily supports CPS agency actions after
placing a child in foster care, the 2018 Family First Prevention Services Act
seeks to provide financial support to state efforts to prevent the need for foster
care placements by providing prevention services to children and families.302
This essential reform rests on the recognition of the harms of removing
children from their parents—as the federal Children’s Bureau put it in 2018,
“the trauma of unnecessary parent-child separation.”303 Unfortunately, the
Family First Act provides funds to help states avoid foster care, even if states
can do so without avoiding parent-child separations. This point is written into
the statute’s goals—funding is available for services “directly related to the
safety, permanence, or well-being of the child or to preventing the child from
entering foster care.”304
The statute explicitly envisions avoiding formal foster care through
kinship placements, and a review of the statute shows how it could be used to
support state efforts to use hidden foster care to prevent a child from entering
formal foster care. The Family First Act provides funding to CPS agencies to
serve foster care “candidates”—children “at imminent risk of entering foster
care” but “who can remain safely in the child’s home or in a kinship placement”
301. See id. at 2.
302. Pub. L. No. 115-123, div. E, tit. VII, 132 Stat. 232 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered

sections of 42 U.S.C.); id. § 50702, 132 Stat. at 232 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 622 note (2018)).
303. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NO. ACYF-CB-PI-18-09,

STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTING TITLE IV-E PREVENTION AND FAMILY SERVICES
AND PROGRAMS 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/3PV2-VGTL. This view responds to welldocumented harms of removing children from their families when a viable means of
keeping the children with their families exists. See, e.g., Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child
Protection and Adult Crime: Using Investigator Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of
Foster Care, 116 J. POL. ECON. 746, 748 (2008) (finding that children placed in foster care
for any length of time were three times more likely to be arrested, convicted, and
imprisoned as adults than were similarly at-risk children left with their parents);
Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Foster
Care, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1583, 1607 (2007) (suggesting that children placed in foster care
may have had higher delinquency rates, higher teen birth rates, and lower earnings
than did similarly at-risk children left with their parents); see also Vivek Sankaran
et al., A Cure Worse than the Disease? The Impact of Removal on Children and Their
Families, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1161, 1165-69 (2019) (collecting and summarizing studies
demonstrating harms to children from removal).
304. Family First Prevention Services Act § 50711(a)(2), 132 Stat. at 232-33 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(1)) (emphasis added).
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with some kind of prevention services.305 Those services must be mental
health or substance abuse treatment services or “in-home parent skill-based
programs.”306 This could include a range of services relevant to hidden foster
care cases—services to aid reunification with parents, services to help the child
with a mental health or substance abuse condition (including mental health
care to help the child adjust to their new living arrangements), and any
assistance offered to the kinship caregivers to facilitate permanence.
So the Family First Act could lead to more reunification services in hidden
foster care cases, addressing an important concern with present practice.307 But
the statute does not require states to make these efforts. CPS agencies could
facilitate a change in physical custody through hidden foster care, provide the
kinship caregiver with TANF support, and provide some kind of mental
health service to the child or some kind of “parenting” skills program to the
kinship caregiver.308
Other provisions of the Family First Act explicitly envision using federal
funds to support children in hidden foster care, including the most extreme
forms of the practice that effectuate permanent changes in custody. To access
federal funds, a state agency must develop a “written prevention plan” for each
child it seeks to keep out of foster care.309 Those plans require agencies to
“identify the foster care prevention strategy for the child so that the child may
remain safely at home, live temporarily with a kin caregiver until reunification can
be safely achieved, or live permanently with a kin caregiver.”310 Congress thus
explicitly envisioned that these new federal funds would be available to
provide services to children and their family members when state action
temporarily—or even permanently—changed their custody. The Family First
Act contains no provision ensuring any such change of custody meets any

305. Id. § 50711(b), 132 Stat. at 240 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(13)) (emphasis

306.
307.
308.

309.
310.

added); see also id. § 50711(a)(2), 132 Stat. at 233 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 671(e)(2)(A)) (permitting states to use funding to support services to foster care
candidates who “can remain safely at home or in a kinship placement with receipt of
services or programs” (emphasis added)). CPS agencies must meet certain other conditions
to access this funding. Id. § 50711(a)(2), 132 Stat. at 233-38 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 671(e)(4)-(5)).
Id. § 50711(a)(2), 132 Stat. at 232-33 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(1)).
See supra Part III.B.2.
Indeed, discussion of how to implement Family First in one state that heavily uses
hidden foster care has focused on more funding for kinship navigator programs so that
they exist statewide. See O’Connor, supra note 222.
Family First Prevention Services Act § 50711(a)(2), 132 Stat. at 233-34 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(4)(A)).
Id. § 50711(a)(2), 132 Stat. at 233 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(4)(A)(i)(I))
(emphasis added).
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particular legal standard, or that states provide any specific due process
protections before effectuating such a change in custody.
Moreover, the Family First Act creates a new performance measure that
further incentivizes CPS agencies to use hidden foster care. Starting in 2021,
the federal Children’s Bureau must track the percentage of foster care
candidates whom CPS agencies successfully keep out of foster care.311 Given
the Act’s purpose of keeping children out of foster care, this seems like a
reasonable data point. Yet Congress explicitly included “those [children] placed
with a kin caregiver outside of foster care” as children to be counted as not
entering foster care,312 and Congress did not require states to report the
number of foster care candidates who were successfully kept with their parents.
Federal agency guidance for reporting data for children with “prevention
plans” similarly omits any requirement to distinguish foster care candidates
successfully kept in their homes from those moved through CPS action to
informal kinship placements.313 CPS agencies can thus make themselves look
good to federal overseers by using hidden foster care—that practice will
successfully keep children out of foster care and thus look like successful
foster care prevention. Such actions will not, of course, involve successfully
protecting family integrity—CPS agencies will still facilitate changes in
children’s custody.
B. State Codification and Minimal Regulation of Hidden Foster Care
Parallel to federal statutes institutionalizing and further incentivizing
hidden foster care, several states have acted over the last decade to codify
hidden foster care while imposing only modest regulations on it, if any at all.
A small number of states have enacted statutes to this effect. In 2014, the
Illinois legislature passed a brief statute that added one paragraph regarding
safety plans to its Children and Family Services Act, explicitly recognizing
them in statute for the first time.314 That law imposes minimal requirements
on safety plans: They must be written and be signed by all parties including a
parent or guardian, the “responsible adult caregiver” who is taking physical
custody of the child, and a CPS representative.315 CPS must provide all parties a
copy of the plan, along with information on their legal rights, and must obtain
311. Id. § 50711(a)(2), 132 Stat. at 238 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(6)(A)(i)).
312. Id.
313. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TECHNICAL BULLETIN

NO. 1: TITLE IV-E PREVENTION PROGRAM DATA ELEMENTS 2, 9 (2019), https://perma.cc/
V2ES-RPL7.
314. Pub. Act No. 98-830, § 5, 2014 Ill. Laws 3922 (codified at 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/21
(2019)).
315. Id. § 5, 2014 Ill. Laws at 3925 (codified at 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/21(f)).
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supervisory approval of the plan.316 But the statute does not define what those
rights are, nor does it establish any procedures for resolving disagreements
about any safety plan provisions or the length a plan would be in place, nor
does it put any substantive limitations on safety plan contents, require
consultation with agency attorneys, or provide attorneys for parents or
children. As Diane Redleaf described these changes, they did not provide “much
comfort to the parents who were still coerced into accepting safety plan
separations.”317 They codified the practice without regulating it.
Florida similarly enacted legislation in 2014 that codified hidden foster
care without regulating it much.318 The legislature required CPS investigators
to use safety plans when identifying a danger to a child and explicitly permitted
safety plans to be “in-home” or “out-of-home.”319 The legislation includes neither
any limits on safety plan contents nor any procedural limitations close to those
proposed in Part VI.A.320
Somewhat more frequent than statutes are CPS agency policies, and
occasionally regulations, that address safety plans that change children’s
custody.321 These policies have increased in number in recent years,
institutionalizing the hidden foster care practice.322 Despite their number,
these policies do not impose much regulation. Some states describe “out-ofhome” safety plans in their policies, but without imposing limits on the time
such out-of-home plans may be in effect or providing clear rules on what
conditions require such plans to end.323 Others limit the duration of safety
316. Id.
317. REDLEAF, supra note 7, at 190.
318. Act of June 23, 2014, ch. 224, § 8, 2014 Fla. Laws 2981, 2998-3003 (codified as amended at

FLA. STAT. § 39.301(9), (14) (2019)).
319. Id. § 8, 2014 Fla. Laws at 2999-3001 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 39.301(9)(a)(6)).
320. Implementing regulations direct that CPS investigators “must develop an out-of-home

safety plan” when they determine that the child cannot remain safely at home.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65C-29.003(3)(a)(1) (2019). Florida regulations do require
supervisory review within twenty-four hours of a safety plan, but require no agency
lawyer review or any other due process checks. See id. r. 65C-29.003(3)(c).
321. Ryan Shellady has helpfully catalogued these policies and regulations. See Shellady,
supra note 14, at 1634 n.130.
322. For instance, Georgia and South Carolina adopted their policies in 2015. GA. DIV.
OF FAMILY & CHILDREN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE POLICY MANUAL § 5.6, at 1 (2015),
https://perma.cc/77C5-ZSDT; S.C. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 30, § 719.02. Texas
adopted its policy in 2018. TEX. DEP’T OF FAMILY & PROTECTIVE SERVS., PARENTAL
CHILD SAFETY PLACEMENT (PCSP) RESOURCE GUIDE 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/SXZ22AQ6.
323. E.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURT, SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO, IDAHO CHILD PROTECTION
MANUAL 18-20 (5th ed. 2018), https://perma.cc/2CEX-VC94; VA. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS.,
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: A GUIDE TO INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES (2019),
https://perma.cc/5L63-RES8.
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plans—usually to one to three months.324 Others require reviews by agency
staff or other ongoing agency monitoring of safety plans, but no external
checks and balances or even internal legal reviews.325 Agency policies that
require court oversight when physical custody changes are the outliers.326
A central feature of this state-by-state policymaking is that it is mostly just
that—policymaking, not lawmaking. CPS agencies write the policies that they
want and may adjust them as they desire. With the exceptions noted above,
state safety plan policies lack legislative approval, or the comparative difficulties
of amending statutes. Similarly, because they are policies and not regulations,
CPS agencies have adopted them without notice-and-comment rulemaking or
any other checks provided through administrative law.327
Moreover, agencies’ compliance with their own policies can be lacking—
especially in hidden foster care, which does not involve court oversight.
Indeed, there is evidence that CPS agencies frequently violate their own
policies. In Illinois, the Family Defense Center (with law firm assistance)
documented CPS agencies’ violations of their own policies requiring regular
reviews of safety plan terms, notice to parents of the factual basis for insisting
upon a safety plan, and meaningful consideration of parental requests to
terminate or amend safety plans.328 In South Carolina, litigation has alleged that
a safety plan remained in effect for far longer than the ninety days permitted
by CPS agency policy.329
324. E.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 660-5-34.06(3)(a)(2) (2019) (90 days); GA. DIV. OF FAMILY &

325.

326.

327.
328.

329.

CHILDREN SERVS., supra note 322, § 5.6, at 1 (45 days); ME. OFFICE OF CHILD & FAMILY
SERVS., CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES POLICY § IV.D(VI)(A)(C)(6) (2018), https://perma.cc/
4ZUQ-UKZ6 (30 days); MONT. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD AND
FAMILY SERVICES POLICY MANUAL § 202-3, at 11 (2015), https://perma.cc/964Y-52JA
(30 days); S.C. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 30, § 719.02 (90 days); TEX. DEP’T OF
FAMILY & PROTECTIVE SERVS., supra note 322, at 1 (60 days “in most instances”); VT.
DEP’T FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, FAMILY SERVICES POLICY MANUAL ch. 52, at 8 (2019),
https://perma.cc/Y5NU-JBQ9 (one month).
E.g., ARIZ. DEP’T OF CHILD SAFETY, POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL ch. 2, § 7 (2019),
https://perma.cc/3LRY-H76K; GA. DIV. OF FAMILY & CHILDREN SERVS., supra note 322,
§ 5.6, at 3-4; OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5101:2-37-02(J) (2019); OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., DHS
CHILD WELFARE PROCEDURE MANUAL ch. 4, § 4, at 486 (2020), https://perma.cc/4WW3M2J9 (requiring review every 30 days).
I have identified only one state that so requires. See ALASKA OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S
SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES MANUAL § 2.2.5.1(F)(1)(c) (2019), https://perma.cc/
WJ7S-KSUT.
Shellady, supra note 14, at 1636-37. But see id. at 1636 n.137 (noting Louisiana as an
outlier for having its safety plan framework codified by statute).
See FAMILY DEF. CTR., UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
& FAMILY SERVICES’ ABUSE AND NEGLECT INVESTIGATIONS IN ILLINOIS: A BASIC GUIDE FOR
ILLINOIS PARENTS AND OTHER CAREGIVERS 48-50, app. B (2016), https://perma.cc/PQ44WBEP; Shellady, supra note 14, at 1626-27.
Complaint, supra note 66, ¶ 13.
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VI. Legally Domesticating Safety Plans and Hidden Foster Care
Many advocates have called for greater regulation of hidden foster care—
some with the primary goal of requiring CPS agencies to work more
effectively with and provide more supports to kinship caregivers,330 others
focused on protecting parents’ and children’s rights to family integrity.331 Both
are important goals, and greater regulation is necessary not only to ensure
kinship caregivers get necessary support, but also to ensure that children’s
custody changes only when legally warranted and that the process leading to
such decisions gathers the essential evidence and takes into account all related
perspectives.
This Article’s call for regulation requires two prefatory comments. First,
regulation rather than prohibition of hidden foster care is necessary because
informal and truly voluntary changes in custody are sometimes appropriate
actions, as described in Part III.A. Second, while this Part is largely focused on
legislative and executive branch regulation, court-imposed reforms through
litigation remain worth pursuing. Courts can declare that procedures leading
to hidden foster care are unduly coercive and could even order certain reforms
to meet minimal standards of due process—such as a requirement that parents
be able to challenge agency actions in hidden foster care cases, as discussed in
Part VI.A.5.
This Part will focus on legislative and executive regulation because the
litigation history discussed in Part II reveals significant limitations in courts’
willingness or ability to regulate this practice fully. Several circuits have ruled
that there is no due process issue at all.332 Moreover, no matter how the circuit
split regarding the due process implications described in Part II is resolved,
legislative and administrative action is necessary. Even if courts universally
held that hidden foster care violates the constitutional right to family integrity
without due process, courts are unlikely to replace existing practice or to
prohibit the use of any safety plans.333 Rather, courts that find safety plans to
violate parents’ due process rights indicate that these state actions trigger the
need for some procedural protections—but do not specify what those protections
are.334 These courts suggest that, institutionally, they want to defer to other
330. See, e.g., Wallace & Lee, supra note 45, at 425 (arguing for services to “diverted kinship

families”).
331. See, e.g., REDLEAF, supra note 7, at 37-50 (critiquing Dupuy); Pearson, supra note 14, at 836

(criticizing safety plans as unduly limiting family integrity without adequate procedures);
Shellady, supra note 14, at 1627-34 (criticizing Dupuy); Simon, supra note 196, at 348.
332. See supra Part II.A.
333. See supra Part II.B.3. Others have concluded that legislative reforms are needed. See, e.g.,
Pearson, supra note 14, at 837.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
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branches of government to define the precise structure of procedural reforms.
And even if courts were to impose their own reforms, courts could only order
reforms necessary to meet constitutional minimums, leaving out several
important reforms that could be achieved through legislative or executive
action.335 Accordingly, this Article advocates that hidden foster care be hidden
no longer and that the practice be legally domesticated336—regulated to ensure
accurate and voluntary decisionmaking, fair procedures, and individual case
and systemic oversight.
To that end, this Part proposes a set of protections for individual cases, as
well as a set of federal child welfare law reforms designed to bring hidden
foster care cases under the umbrella of federal data tracking and oversight.
Both sets of recommendations recognize that kinship diversion is a practice
that will continue and that the practice involves a severe enough exercise of
state power—involving important rights of multiple people—to warrant
strong regulation.
A. Procedural Protections and Substantive Limits
Congress, state legislatures, the federal Children’s Bureau, and state CPS
agencies should enact a set of procedural protections and substantive limits
to follow in each individual case to ensure CPS agencies effectuate changes
in custody only when necessary, and to mitigate the concerns outlined in
Part III.B. These protections should be enacted by legislatures or, at a minimum,
promulgated as agency regulations to alleviate the challenge of an agency
regulating itself via its internal policies.337
These procedural reforms would impose costs on state child protection
systems—costs of lawyers for parents, costs of court hearings when sought
by parents, and costs of additional staff. CPS agencies are sensitive to these
costs and have invoked them when pressured to provide more procedural
protections for families in hidden foster care.338 These costs are well worth
incurring. As the Supreme Court said in an early due process case involving the
child protection system, “the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency,” and constitutional protections serve to protect individuals “from
335. The most significant reform that would likely be beyond the present state of federal

constitutional law is the right to counsel proposed in Part VI.A.1. The Supreme Court
has ruled that the Constitution does not guarantee parents facing a termination of
parental rights the right to counsel. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32
(1981). So it is unlikely that the Court would hold that due process requires the
provision of counsel to parents facing a choice whether to agree to a safety plan.
336. See supra note 8.
337. See supra text accompanying note 327.
338. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 286.

900

America’s Hidden Foster Care System
72 STAN. L. REV. 841 (2020)

the overbearing concern for efficiency” that can drive government agencies.339
Moreover, these procedural costs are essential to addressing the policy
concerns discussed in Part III.B. Nonetheless, addressing those concerns within
real-world budgetary and political constraints is important for any achievable
reform agenda, so this Subpart will also address both how states can use federal
financial assistance to pay for one of these proposed reforms (prepetition
counsel for parents) and how the proposed reforms moderate additional costs.
1.

Appoint attorneys for parents subject to possible safety plans

Hidden foster care is hidden from court oversight, meaning it is also
generally hidden from lawyers for individuals affected by CPS agency action,
who are typically appointed only once formal court proceedings begin.
Providing lawyers for parents in such cases is a crucial means to impose a
meaningful check on these assertions of CPS agency authority. This Subpart
will explain the importance of providing these lawyers and detail a recent
change in federal funding policy that can help states pay for them.
Whenever CPS agencies ask parents to agree to change the physical
custody of their child, they should provide an appointed attorney for the
parent.340 As the Seventh Circuit explained in Dupuy, a justification for safety
plans is that they are like criminal plea bargains or civil settlements.341 As
discussed above, safety plans differ in several key ways from plea bargains
and civil settlements—especially in the absence of attorneys for parents.342
Providing attorneys to parents can help make bargaining situations much
more fair. After all, an agency and a parent negotiate “in the shadow of the
law,”343 so having a lawyer advise a parent as to their rights and the agency’s
rights under the law provides essential information about the law’s shadow.344
339. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
340. Time pressures could affect how such attorneys could interact with their clients. CPS

341.
342.

343.

344.

agencies could reasonably impose safety plans on parents that last for no more than
twenty-four or forty-eight hours, until an attorney could consult with the parents and
then negotiate a somewhat longer-lasting safety plan with the agency.
Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text. As noted above, the presence of counsel
is less frequent in some civil cases. See supra note 127. It is, however, the norm in formal
foster care cases. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (discussing this phenomenon in the context
of divorce negotiations).
See Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 522 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting parents’
consultation with an attorney as an important factor in procedural due process
analysis); see also Garlinghouse & Trowbridge, supra note 46, at 117 (“[A]dvice of
counsel as to likely outcomes and rights regarding voluntary participation can be
helpful.”).
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Providing lawyers at this stage would expand existing statutory rights to
counsel, which are typically triggered by the initiation of court proceedings.345
A central point of this Article is that state CPS agencies engage in critical
intervention in families without ever initiating court proceedings. That level
of intervention outside of court justifies providing counsel to parents.
Lawyers are essential for helping parents navigate safety plan negotiations—
perhaps more so than any of this Article’s other recommendations—because
legal analysis is required to understand parents’ leverage in these negotiations.
Parents’ leverage will depend on several factors, including: first, the substantive
legal standards, especially whether the CPS agency is justified in declaring a
child abused or neglected, and, even if so, whether an emergency or pretrial
removal is legally justified;346 second, the state’s burden to prove abuse or
neglect to a family court;347 third, application of the state’s obligation to prove
that it made reasonable efforts to prevent removal;348 and, fourth, whether the
particular facts rise to abuse or neglect under the state’s statute or the related
question whether the state can prove such facts through admissible evidence at
trial. Exercising a parent’s leverage requires a lawyer to understand the case
and advise the parent accordingly. Otherwise, the agency has a tremendous
information advantage—they are repeat players negotiating with parents
who, in the aggregate, are of a low socioeconomic status and likely do not
understand the nuances of child protection law, but certainly understand that
the agency is threatening their relationships with their children.
Lawyers for parents can help craft safety plans that address each family’s
individual needs more effectively. Indeed, the Children’s Bureau has concluded
that legal representation enhances the parties’ engagement in case planning
and leads to more individualized case plans.349 Similar improvements to
the quality of safety plans should be expected—including more accurate
determinations regarding both the need for a safety plan at all and specific
safety plan provisions.
345. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2304(b)(1) (2019) (triggering appointment of counsel for parents

346.
347.
348.
349.

of children named in court petitions); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1620(3) (2019) (providing a
right to counsel to parents “subject to any judicial proceeding”). Katherine Pearson
proposes informing parents of their right to consult with counsel if a case proceeded to
court. Pearson, supra note 14, at 873. But establishing a clear right to counsel before
agreeing to a safety plan would broaden existing right to counsel statutes.
These standards may also vary by jurisdiction. See Simon, supra note 196, at 368-75
(categorizing state removal statutes).
This burden also varies by state. Provencher et al., supra note 146, at 27.
See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i) (2018).
See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NO. ACYF-CB-IM-17-02,
HIGH QUALITY LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ALL PARTIES IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS
2 (2017), https://perma.cc/3TLU-G8JK.
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Providing parents with attorneys could lead CPS agencies to catch some
of their own errors. Some kind of internal review by agency lawyers is
commonplace before bringing a case to court, but is often lacking in hidden
foster care cases.350 Providing lawyers to parents in these cases should trigger
the involvement of CPS agency lawyers as well, and thus provide appropriate
counseling to agency caseworkers (including advising caseworkers when they
lack legal authority to remove children and thus lack leverage to insist upon a
safety plan).
This call for parent representation also finds some empirical support.
Emerging evidence from two quasi-experimental studies demonstrates parents’
attorneys from model parent representation offices generally help achieve
positive outcomes for their clients and the system—accelerating the time to
reunify children with parents and finalize guardianships, reducing length of
stays in foster care, and doing so without compromising safety.351 Children
were reunified with parents significantly faster when their parents had
attorneys from model parent representation offices.352 Importantly, this
increased speed of reunification did not leave children in any greater safety
risk, as measured by the frequency of documented repeat maltreatment.353
That finding suggests parent representation is not likely to jeopardize the
safety of children subject to safety plans. Of course, state CPS agencies would be
free to bring cases to family court if they could prove that a parent had abused
or neglected a child and that foster care was necessary. In addition, both studies
found that speed to reach other forms of permanency—guardianships and
adoptions in the Washington study,354 and guardianships in the New York
study355—increased through model parent representation. That finding suggests
parents’ lawyers do negotiate permanent custody arrangements that involve
their clients losing custody of their children. A reasonable extrapolation is
350. At least one state requires review by agency lawyers before bringing a case to court by

351.

352.
353.
354.
355.

policy. See supra text accompanying note 200. More broadly, the American Bar
Association considers a lawyer’s involvement in “prepar[ing] the initial petition” a
“basic obligation[]” of lawyers representing CPS agencies. AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS
OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES 4 (2004)
(capitalization altered), https://perma.cc/GR5Z-6TCE; see also id. at 7 (“The agency
attorney should work with the agency to bring only appropriate cases to court.”).
See Mark E. Courtney & Jennifer L. Hook, Evaluation of the Impact of Enhanced Parental
Legal Representation on the Timing of Permanency Outcomes for Children in Foster Care, 34
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1337, 1338, 1340-42 (2012); Gerber et al., supra note 130,
at 52. Other studies have found similar benefits but have various limitations. See Gerber
et al., supra note 130, at 44 tbl.1.
Courtney & Hook, supra note 351, at 1338, 1340-42; Gerber et al., supra note 130, at 43, 52.
Gerber et al., supra note 130, at 51-52.
Courtney & Hook, supra note 351, at 1340-42.
Gerber et al., supra note 130, at 52.
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that parent attorneys would negotiate reasonable safety plan conditions in
appropriate cases.356
* * *
The Children’s Bureau expanded Title IV-E funding eligibility in January
2019 to include legal representation for parents.357 Title IV-E authorizes the
Children’s Bureau to reimburse states for half of the expenditures “found
necessary by the Secretary . . . for the proper and efficient administration of the
State plan.”358 Through the January 2019 guidance, the Children’s Bureau
determined that providing “independent legal representation by an attorney”
for both children and parents qualifies under this standard.359 This federal
funding is available both when children are in CPS agency custody and subject
to an open family court case and when the child is a “candidate for title IV-E
foster care.”360 The statute defines a foster care “candidate” as including
someone “at imminent risk of entering foster care” but “who can remain safely
in the child’s home or in a kinship placement” with some kind of prevention
services.361 A child subject to safety plans seems to fit easily in the statutory
definition of a foster care “candidate.” Thus, the new Children’s Bureau
guidance establishes that federal funds may support the provision of counsel to
the parents of these children.
This reform opens the door to significant increases in funding for parent
and child representation—estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of
dollars362—and thus could pay much of the cost to provide counsel in safety
plan cases when that reform was not possible in prior years. The new federal
funding will cover 50% of the cost of counsel in eligible cases.363 Roughly
half of cases are Title IV-E eligible,364 so this new funding would cover about
25% of the total cost. However, that percentage applies not only to an expanded
356. These extrapolations from existing data should, of course, be subject to evaluation;
357.
358.

359.
360.
361.
362.

363.
364.

states should create prepetition parent representation so such evaluations may occur.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE POLICY
MANUAL § 8.1B(30) (2020), https://perma.cc/AV9D-W6B4.
42 U.S.C. § 674(a)(3) (2018). Legal representation for parents falls into the catch-all
category of such costs, for which the statute sets a 50% reimbursement rate. Id.
§ 674(a)(3)(E).
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 357, § 8.1B(30).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 675(13) (emphasis added).
See John Kelly, Trump Administration Rule Change Could Unleash Hundreds of Millions in
Federal Funds to Defend Rights of Parents, Children in Child Protection Cases, CHRON. SOC.
CHANGE (Feb. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/2225-JE78.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 357, § 8.1B(30).
CHILD TRENDS, TITLE IV-E SPENDING BY CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES 4 (2018),
https://perma.cc/62WM-J2VG.
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provision of counsel—that is, in safety plan cases without a petition—but to all
provision of counsel. Previously, states had to pay the full cost of providing
appointed counsel, but now they can receive a federal reimbursement of a
significant percentage of that total amount—which should be sufficient to
provide counsel in prepetition cases.
2.

Provide parents notice of the factual basis for a change in custody

Some amount of notice appropriate to the circumstances of a case is “no
doubt” a required part of due process.365 In safety plan cases in which CPS
agencies insist on any form of a change in custody, the agency should provide
the parent with specific written notice of the factual basis for that insistence.366
Even cases like Dupuy, where the court held safety plans to be voluntary,
recognize that voluntariness depends on the legitimacy of the CPS agency’s
insistence on that separation.367 Providing notice forces CPS agencies to write
down their justification and enables parents (ideally with their lawyers, as
described below) to evaluate the legal strength of that insistence and determine
whether to contest or agree to it.
3.

Set a maximum length of time for safety plans

No safety plan should change a child’s physical custody indefinitely. To the
contrary, a relatively brief maximum length of time should govern such safety
plans, after which either the safety plan ceases to be in effect and the child must
be able to reunify or courts must become involved.368 If a case cannot be
resolved in that time frame—for instance, if a parent’s need for rehabilitation is
so severe that he or she cannot regain custody—the case warrants court
oversight. A maximum timeline also creates deadline pressure for the agency to
help a parent reunify (and for the parent to cooperate with those efforts) to
avoid the cost and uncertainty of court proceedings.
The Family First Act, discussed in Part V.A.2, implies the need for time
limits. The Family First Act provides funding flexibility to provide services
“for not more than a 12-month period.”369 Some state policies provide even
shorter timelines, such as ninety days.370
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
Shellady, supra note 14, at 1644-45.
Supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
Several states have recognized this point. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
Other critics have recommended such rules without specifying a precise limit. E.g.,
Pearson, supra note 14, at 873.
369. 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(1)(A)-(B) (2018).
370. E.g., S.C. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 30, § 719.02.
365.
366.
367.
368.
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Maximum time limits should be quite brief—no longer than thirty days.
Many formal foster care cases are resolved faster than that.371 Longer time
periods—like the twelve months permitted under the Families First Act—make
sense for provision of services to a family that remains intact. But when CPS
agencies effectuate a breakup of the family, even a temporary one, twelve
months is far too long.372 If separations of parents and children longer than
thirty days are truly necessary, this suggests a need for court oversight because
the parent poses a more significant danger to the child or needs a more
intensive set of rehabilitative services before reunification is safe. If either is
the case, then family court checks and balances and oversight are particularly
important for all the reasons explained in Part III.B.
In addition, statutes or regulations should make clear that once a maximum
timeline expires, absent court rulings to the contrary, a parent has the right to
regain physical custody of their child without negative repercussions. Such
statements are necessary given the existence of cases in which safety plans are
extended indefinitely, even past state agency policy guidelines.373
4.

Include an exit strategy

Formal foster care triggers state obligations to develop detailed and
individualized case plans and to make reasonable efforts to prevent the need
for removal and reunify parents and children, and hidden foster care avoids
those requirements.374 A reasonably short time limit avoids many of the
concerns with the loss of those requirements; either families will reunify or
371. Sankaran & Church, supra note 194, at 216-17.
372. Some states have voluntary foster care statutes that have longer timelines than suggested

in this Article. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16507.3(a) (West 2019) (providing a
default limit of 180 days on placements, with the possibility of extension). Voluntary
foster care cases impose on the CPS agency obligations equivalent to those in formal
foster care cases. See, e.g., id. § 16507.5 (requiring local CPS agencies to “make any and all
reasonable and necessary provisions for the care, supervision, custody, conduct,
maintenance, and support of the minor”); CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 357, § 8.3A.13(5),
https://perma.cc/U25R-2HRJ (requiring the CPS agency to take “placement and care
responsibility for the child”). This Article’s conclusion is that parents should have
counsel, notice, and access to court oversight in those cases. Federal funding law
suggests that court oversight is available; when parents seek to terminate a voluntary
placement agreement, such agreements “shall be deemed to be revoked unless the State
agency . . . obtains a judicial determination” that the child must remain in state custody,
42 U.S.C. § 672(g). A state that has existing law for such formal voluntary foster care
placements could use that as a template for regulation of hidden foster care cases, and
the Children’s Bureau could cite that option as one means to provide adequate due
process protections. Because not every state has or uses such statutes, this Article does
not further address them.
373. E.g., supra text accompanying note 66.
374. See supra Part IV.B.
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CPS agencies will have to go to court and thus trigger those requirements.
Nonetheless, plans should be clear regarding what would enable parents and
children to reunify, especially when that could be possible fairly quickly. This
proposal recognizes that a maximum time limit is just that, and that a change
in a child’s custody should last no longer than necessary given the individual
needs of a case. The length in a specific case should be subject to case-by-case
negotiation and renegotiation as the case develops. Perhaps a restraining order
against or arrest of a parent’s partner who had abused the child, medical or
mental health treatment that stabilizes a parent after an acute crisis, or new
housing would suffice. When that is the case, it should be spelled out in safety
plans so that when parents meet those conditions they can insist upon
reunification.375
5.

Permit parents to seek court review of safety plans

Much room exists for reasonable debate regarding the contents of individual
safety plans—CPS agencies and parents could reasonably disagree on whether
abuse or neglect has occurred, whether a change in physical custody is necessary,
whether one or both parents or adults in a home need to be separated from
children, what level of supervision of a parent’s contact with children is
required, or what is necessary before parents and children can reunify. Parents
should be allowed to challenge such safety plan provisions without risking
foster care and an abuse or neglect petition against them.
Absent any provision to trigger court oversight during a safety plan, parents
must either abide by CPS agency safety plan demands or face tremendous
risks—and parents rarely choose the latter.376 Providing a mechanism for
parents to challenge a safety plan in court without triggering an abuse or
neglect petition or removal would create a more meaningful check on CPS
agency authority while respecting the occasional benefits of safety plans.
Parents should be able to insist on a court hearing to review a safety plan under
the same standards that govern pre-adjudication removals, and under the
same timeline—usually forty-eight or seventy-two hours—provided to review
emergency removals because those are the most closely analogous actions.377
375. Spelling out such conditions would also aid decisionmaking in closer cases when

parents claim that they have substantially complied with conditions or have met as
many conditions as ought to be necessary.
376. Indeed, Dupuy made no reference to even a single parent rejecting a CPS agency request
to agree to a safety plan, Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2006), and an attorney
for the plaintiffs has asserted that the full trial record revealed no such parent,
REDLEAF, supra note 7, at 44-45.
377. Other critics of safety plans have made similar recommendations. See, e.g., Pearson,
supra note 14, at 873; Shellady, supra note 14, at 1646-47.
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Parents should be able to trigger this provision at any point. Consider, for
instance, a case of suspected physical abuse. The evidence early in a case might
raise probable cause of abuse justifying an emergency removal, and a parent
might therefore agree to a safety plan to avoid going to court, even if the
parent insists that they did not abuse their child.378 But additional medical
evidence might raise doubts about the abuse allegations,379 and the parent
could then request the termination of the safety plan. If the agency does not
agree, the parent should be able to press their case in court, rather than be
bound by their earlier decision made with less information.
These reviews would impose only minimal procedural costs. They would
involve single hearings reviewing a safety plan—unlike a formal foster care
case, which may involve a full trial and a series of review hearings for an
indeterminate period of time.380 Moreover, they would be triggered only by
parents who feel aggrieved by a safety plan decision; cases in which families
decide that safety plans present the best option,381 and involve a more genuine
agreement with families, need not trigger court reviews.
B. Applying the Federal Regulatory Apparatus
The federal government plays an essential role in the operation of and
policy debates within the modern child protection system. While the federal
child welfare legal architecture now implicitly recognizes the hidden foster
care system through the steps discussed in Part V.A, it has not brought
the practice within the federal child protection regulatory system. That is a
central reason why the practice remains hidden—basic data is not gathered or
reported, federal requirements do not regulate the practice, and federal reviews
of state performance do not evaluate state use of the practice. This Article calls
on Congress and the federal Children’s Bureau to bring hidden foster care
within the federal child protection regulatory system, and this Subpart
discusses three central elements for such federal regulation.

378. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 522 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[F]rom the

departing parent’s standpoint, judicial review may not be the preferred method of
resolving the matter, for the statutory procedures envision a hearing within three
days, and the evidence or allegations may be such that the parent believes the matter
likely cannot be adjudicated quickly.”).
379. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313, 1317, 1321 (Conn. 1983) (describing medical
evidence that eventually exonerated the parents after a child’s unexplained death).
380. Federal funding law spells out requirements for regular reviews for children in formal
foster care. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (2018).
381. See supra Part III.A.
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1.

Data gathering

States gather and report key data as a condition of receiving federal
funding. This data then informs policy discussions. If the data is not gathered
or reported, important policy discussions either do not happen or happen
without adequate information.382 As discussed above, there is a dearth of hard
data about states’ use of hidden foster care, and this is a key reason hidden
foster care is hidden.383 An essential step is for the federal government to
require state CPS agencies to report the number of cases in which they
effectuate a change in physical custody through safety plans, the duration of
such changes in custody, safety outcomes for affected children, and how such
cases are resolved (that is, by reunification with the parent with whom the
child lived prior to the safety plan, by permanent custody with the alternative
caregiver, by the state opening a family court case, or by some other means).384
Such data reporting is important everywhere and is especially important
in states using flexible federal funding pursuant to the Family First Act, lest
removals via safety plans become a way for states to use federal dollars to
prevent foster care without preventing children’s removals. Congress should
amend the Family First Act’s data reporting requirements to require reporting
on the number of foster care candidates for whom CPS agencies prevent a
parent-child separation, not only those who CPS agencies keep out of foster
care.385
Even without congressional action, provisions within the Family First Act
could provide the basis for important data tracking. States using flexible
funding under the Act must provide data regarding children’s placement status
at the start and end of a one-year period in which the state provides some
mental health or caregiving support service.386 States must also identify
individual strategies used to prevent foster care.387 The Children’s Bureau
should read these two provisions together to require states to report detailed
data on when they use changes in physical custody to prevent foster care and
382. See Shellady, supra note 14, at 1648 (arguing for better data gathering to inform policy

discussions).
383. See supra Part I.B.
384. Such data is currently excluded from federal data reporting requirements. See supra

notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Some states require it to be collected, minimizing
the administrative burden of a new reporting requirement. See, e.g., ARIZ. DEP’T OF
CHILD SAFETY, supra note 325, ch. 2, § 7. Safety outcomes include whether the child was
the subject of further child protection hotline reports and whether any such reports
were substantiated by child protection agencies.
385. Cf. supra text accompanying note 311 (noting the existing provision of the Family First
Act focusing on preventing foster care placements).
386. 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(4)(E)(iii) (2018).
387. Id. § 671(e)(4)(A)(i), (e)(4)(E)(i).
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what happens to children, parents, and kinship caregivers in those cases.
Unfortunately, existing administrative guidance from the Children’s Bureau
does not require states to report when they effectuate a change in physical
custody to hidden foster care;388 the Bureau should revisit that issue.
Requiring greater data reporting would resolve one of the oddities of the
present child protection data reporting regime: States need not report what
happens with the majority of children who CPS agencies deem to be abused or
neglected. CPS agencies report that they take into formal foster care only 23.7%
of children deemed victims of abuse or neglect.389 That percentage varies
significantly from state to state—from a low of 3.9% to a high of 53.1%.390 What
happens to the more than 500,000 children391 deemed victims who are not
brought into formal foster care by CPS agencies? Federally required data
cannot say. This Article projects that a large portion of these children—from
the high tens to the low hundreds of thousands—end up in hidden foster
care.392 And what happens to those children? For instance, how many reunify
with parents (and after how long), how many stay with kinship caregivers
permanently, and how many eventually enter foster care? Federally required
data cannot say, and some CPS agencies even admit they do not know.393
Requiring states to report all uses of hidden foster care would go a long way
toward providing important insights into a large population of children.394
2.

Child and Family Services Reviews

The Children’s Bureau should regulate CPS agencies’ use of kinship
diversion through its Children and Family Services Reviews. CPS agencies are
already subject to these federal reviews of their work in cases involving
388. Supra text accompanying note 313.
389. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 75, at 81, 90 tbl.6-4.
390. See id. at 90 tbl.6-4.
391. CPS agencies identified roughly 674,000 children as abuse or neglect victims in 2017. Id.

at 20. If 76.3% were not removed, id. at 81, that amounts to 514,262 children.
392. See supra Part I.B.
393. The Virginia Mercury quoted the director of the Division of Family Services within the

Virginia Department of Social Services as follows:
If you’re asking me, at the state, what’s occurring with that diversion practice—how is that
happening, how is it occurring, which families are getting services, which are not, how
quickly are the kids going back to the family[,] . . . what are the outcomes, do they ultimately
stay with that family, that sort of thing, I can’t answer those questions for you.

O’Connor, supra note 89; see also VA. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., supra note 89, at 4 (“However,
once diverted, the case is often closed and no additional tracking of the child occurs.”).
394. The federal government could go even broader and require more detailed reporting
about what happens to children deemed victims but not removed by CPS agencies,
including those who remain at home subject to CPS agency oversight of some kind.
While such a step would be beneficial, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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removals to formal foster care, court petitions, and expenditures related to
certain abuse and neglect prevention grants.395 These reviews have become a
primary means of the federal government’s oversight of the quality of state
child protection systems.396 The Children’s Bureau should evaluate the use of
hidden foster care to ensure CPS agencies use it only when necessary and
consistent with procedural requirements outlined above.
Indeed, federal regulations already provide a basis for evaluating hidden
foster care cases—the Children’s Bureau evaluates states on how well they
balance children’s need for safety with the goal that “[c]hildren are safely
maintained in their own homes whenever possible and appropriate.”397
Notably, the regulation focuses on keeping children in their own homes—not
merely keeping them out of foster care. Thus, causing children to leave their
own homes through safety plans should fall well within the Children’s
Bureau’s mandate when performing Child and Family Services Reviews.
3.

Family First Act funding reforms

The Family First Act wisely permits states to use federal funds to prevent
the need to remove children from their parents rather than, as Title IV-E has
historically done, simply to help states pay for foster care. As discussed in
Part V.A, however, the Family First Act’s references to kinship care risk paying
states to use hidden foster care—and thus risk preventing foster care without
preventing the need for removing children from their parents.
Congress should amend the Family First Act to ensure it is implemented
consistently with the goal of preventing unnecessary parent-child separations
and not merely preventing formal foster care placements. When CPS agencies
effectuate a change in physical custody of a child, Congress should require
them to use Family First Act funds to support reunification efforts—not
merely services to support the new kinship placement. Congress should
further insist that when state action causes physical custody changes, states
must follow requirements like those discussed in Part VI.A as a condition of
using Family First Act funds.
Even without congressional action, the Children’s Bureau has authority to
impose similar requirements. Crucially, federal funding via the Family First
Act is discretionary—the Secretary of Health and Human Services “may make a

395. The Reviews, described in 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355.31-.34 (2019), apply to state CPS agencies’

use of certain federal funds. See id. § 1355.31 (delineating the scope of the regulations).
396. See Sankaran & Church, supra note 194, at 234 (describing the Reviews’ history, process,

and function).
397. 45 C.F.R. § 1355.34(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B).
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payment to a State”398—compared with other provisions of Title IV-E that are
mandatory.399 Requirements reasonably related to the purpose of preventing
“the trauma of unnecessary parent-child separation,”400 as the Children’s Bureau
has put it, are thus relevant to how the Bureau exercises its discretionary
funding authority. Other more specific provisions of the Family First Act also
imply this authority. For each child, the state must “identify the foster care
prevention strategy” it will use.401 When that strategy is a change in physical
custody, it is reasonable to expect states to explain why that strategy is
necessary, and the Bureau may reasonably insist on some steps to ensure that
identified prevention strategies are appropriate.402
Conclusion
Beyond the well-established foster care system operated by CPS agencies
and supervised by family courts, most states operate hidden foster care
systems—systems that make profound decisions without court involvement or
oversight, or any meaningful checks and balances. The hidden foster care
system changes custody of children (sometimes permanently), removes legal
obligations for agencies to help reunify parents and children or supervise
children to ensure their safety and well-being, and fails to provide kinship
caregivers with supports comparable to those provided in formal foster care.
This system is literally hidden in that existing data-tracking and reporting
laws do not require states to count how frequently they use this system, let
alone what happens to children who are in it. Despite the lack of data, it is clear
the hidden foster care system is large—roughly on par in size with the number
of children CPS agencies remove from their families and place in formal foster
care every year. And the hidden foster care system intervenes in families
analogously to the formal foster care system. This hidden system is likely
growing and is certainly becoming institutionalized through federal funding

398. 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). The Children’s Bureau sits within the

399.

400.
401.
402.

Department of Health and Human Services, id. § 191, and administers federal child
welfare funding, Children’s Bureau, What We Do, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
https://perma.cc/MK7U-LR8R (archived Feb. 12, 2012).
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(b) (providing that “[t]he Secretary shall approve any plan which
complies with” the Title IV-E requirements in effect before the Family First Act
(emphasis added)).
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 303, at 2.
42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(4)(A)(i)(I).
The Bureau has required states to explain how a “prevention plan” will help the child
live at home or with kin, temporarily or permanently, but has not yet issued details
requiring states to explain why changing custody away from parents is necessary. See
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 303, at 6.
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incentives, new federal funding that strengthens those incentives, and state
policies that seek to codify the practice.
The legal defense to due process challenges—that these are voluntary
placements—is unconvincing in light of the threats to remove children built
into the practice. That conclusion alone requires consideration of meaningful
procedures to protect children’s and parents’ fundamental constitutional right
to family integrity. Even if this defense were convincing as a matter of
constitutional due process, it would be unconvincing as a policy defense of the
system. Taking the due process defense of hidden foster care on its own
terms—terms that insist CPS agencies only make legally justifiable threats to
remove children and that analogize development of safety plans to plea
bargains and civil settlements—underscores the need for significant reforms.
Checks and balances are required to ensure CPS threats are legally justified in
the tens or hundreds of thousands of cases in which they occur and to make
safety plan agreements truly voluntary.
It is thus time to legally domesticate the hidden foster care system though a
mixture of state legislation and reform of federal funding and oversight
systems.
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